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Ab s tract 
The se i zure and sub sequ ent war over the Sue z C ana l in 
19 5 6  is the maj or theme of  thi s  work . The e ff e ct s on the 
internat i onal s ituat ion and wor ld event s are analyzed . The 
maj or part icipant s ,  Great Br ita in under Pr ime Mini s ter S ir 
Anthony Eden , France under Premier Guy M o l let , I srae l und er 
Pr ime Min i s ter Dav id Ben-Gur i on , and Egyp t  und er Pre s ident 
G ama l N a s ser , are developed fr om the ir p er s onal aspirat ion s 
and g oal s surr ound ing the ir act ion s . 
The se  act ion s led t o  the chain of event s which d i srupted 
the bip olar balance of wor ld p ower . The United St at e s '  c on ­
tainment p o licy wa s breeched . Secre t ary of S tate J ohn F o s ter 
Du lle s d id n ot ade quat e ly repre s e nt the p os it i on of the Un ited 
State s in  thi s s itua t i on , which was s tated by Pre s id e nt 
E i s e nhower t o  hi s We stern a l l ie s . Thi s lack of pre c i se com­
municat i on re su lted in  the d i srupt i on of a l lied s olidarity . 
Pre s ident E i s e nhower had t o  initiat e sanc t ions  against  hi s 
a l l ie s  i n  order t o  ha lt the de s truct i on of  We stern inf luence 
in the M idd le E a s t , to  save t he United Nat ion s , and to rep lace 
the r o le p layed by his a l l i e s  in  the area through the E i sen­
hower D octr ine . 
The S ov iet Union accomp li shed an imme n s e  h i s t or i c  succ e s s . 
I t  had succ e s s fu l ly achieved a str ong ly accepted inf luence 
i n  the Middle E as t  which had been d en ied s i nce the 1 7 0 0 ' s . 
The S oviet s t ook advantage of the d iv i s i on s  among We s tern 
p ower s by ent er ing an area where a p ower vacuum ex i s ted . 
Ru s s ia , by c e nter ing atten t i on on the United Nat i on s  and 
dire ct ing world att ent ion t o  the M idd le Ea st , le s s ene d  crit i ­
ci sms again s t  it s action s i n  Hungary, Taking advantage of 
a divided and we akened We st , the S ov i e t  U n i on ruthle s s ly cru shed 
the Hungar ian revo lt . The Sov iet s ,  through unre stricted sup­
p li e s  of arms and e conomic aid t o  the Midd le East, acqu ired 
for themse lve s a more  p opu lar image of S ov i e t  communi sm than 
that of We stern democr acy wi th the Arab nat i onal i st s . 
The United Stat e s  f orced an end t o  the j oint Br i t i sh , 
French , and I srae li inva s i on int o Egyp t . Thi s cau sed deep 
resentment in France wh ich led it t o  br eak fr om the United 
Stat e s  and deve lop its  own separate r o le in wor ld p o l i t i c s . 
It was c lear ly proven that Great Britain and France had s e cre t ly 
negot iated with I srae l regarding I sr ae l's invas ion of Egypt 
and the subsequent comb ined " peace keep ing " inva s i on of the 
Sue z Canal . Great Br itain ' s  con servative government had t o  
b e  rebu i lt , and i t s  ec onomy was ne ar ly shat t ered . Arab nat i on­
alism became d i v ided betwe e n  the  We s t  and N a s s er ' s neutral 
S oviet -backed government . The S ov iet U n i on gained unpre ­
cedented succe s s ,  and i t s  influence was read i ly ac cepted . 
The United S tate s was f orced t o  be ar a larger r o l e  in the area 
be cau se  of  the Ei senhower D oc tr ine . Amer ica ' s  democrat ic  
ideals  were viewed with su sp i c ion , and i t s  c ontainment p o li cy 
was breeched . 
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Chapter One 
The Root s of Conf li.ct in, the Mid,dle Ea s t  
The Middle E a st hold s a n  important p o s it i on i n  hi s t ory 
for the co lonial emp ire s of Great Br i t ain and France . The 
area wa s named the Midd le E a s t  due t o  i t s  ge ographic p o s i ­
t i on i n  the midd l e  of the over land rout e s  to  the Near E a st 
centers of tr ade , I nd i a  and China; there f ore , the c ountr i e s  
of the Midd le E as t  were lines  o f  c ommunicat i on . Whoever 
c ontr o l led  the se are a s  d ominat ed the Near East  trade . 
From 1 5 8 8  t o  1 9 1 4 ,  Great Br itain suc c e s sfu l ly dominated 
the are a  and all  rout e s  to and from the  Near E a st . By u s ing 
treat i e s  and the p owerful Roya l Navy , Bri tain prevented 
Tsari st Rus sia any entry into the are a . France wa s re legat ed 
t o  minor hold ing s which were non -threatening to  the communi ­
cat i on rou t e s  of the Br it i sh Empire . Germany , from 1 8 7 1 , 
became the maj or power threat t o  Great Br itain ' s  d ominance . 
Wor ld War I marked the beg inning s of d e c l ine f or the Br i t i s h  
Emp ire and French co lonial ho ld i ng s . 
When Wor ld War I s tart e d , the Midd le E ast was divided  
due  to  the Ott oman Empire ' s  union with Austria and Germany 
against  Great Br itai n , France , and Ru s s ia . Great Br itain be ­
came bogged d own in f ierce f ight i ng in Franc e and could not 
de legate adequat e force s to protect it s l ine s of c ommunicat ion 
throug h the Middle E a s t . One o f  the s e  maj or line s of communi ­
cat ion wa s the Sue z Cana l wh ich cut a path t hrough E gypt , 
linking the Medit erranean S e a  with the Red S ea . Great Br itain 
had to  g enerat e a native f orce i n  the are a  to protect  the v ital 
( 2 ) 
line s . A s trong mot ivat ion had to be created in ord er t o  
turn peop le who had c lo s e  rel igiou s  and h i s t ori c t i e s  with 
the Ottoman Empire int o  a f orce aga in st  the Emp ire . Nat i onal 
se lf -determinat ion (or nationa l i sm )  was the mot ivat ion en­
couraged by Great Britain . 1 
Arab nat ionalism , s ince it d i d  not have a gradua l history , 
was a f ierce ly emotion al and some t ime s v i o lent ent ity . V ariou s  
Arab people s d emanded that their national a s p irat ions be 
sat i s f ied . Arab nati on a l i sm was instrumenta l  in the defeat 
of the C e ntra l p ower s' effort s in the area . At the end of 
Wor ld War I ,  many M idd le E a st areas were p lace d  under Le ague 
of Nation s mandate s with Great Britain and France as the d omi ­
nant administrat or s . The Arabs v iewed thi s deve lopment as 
a re ins tatement of c o l on i a l  dominat ion and demanded the ful­
f i l lment of the Allie s '  promi se  f or independence . 2
� 
World War I I  became the turning point f or the area . 
During the early ye ars of the war , the Allies  were hard pre s s ed  
for surv ival . The vital  lin e s  of c ommunication and tran spor­
tat ion had to be s aved . The Arab s were guarantee d  their 
nat ion a l  d e s ire s in order t o  prevent pos s i b le d i srupt i on of 
key line s . With the e nd of World War I I , two new deve lopments 
cau sed inte n s e  c oncern among the Arab Nat i onali s t s . The s e  
were the continued Al lied pre s ence be cau s e  o f  p a s t  treatie s 
and the emergence of large Jewi sh concentrati ons in  P al e st ine . 
Great Britain s t i l l  maintained a mi l itary pre sence in 
the area . I n  E gypt , even though i t  was given its indepe ndence 
( 3 )  
in 1 936 , the Br i t i sh m i l itary occupat ion a long the c anal 
z one d om inat ed Egyp t ian life . Under King F aroukl ru ler of 
Egypt from 1 93 6  to 1 952 , gr owi ng sabot ag e and act s of ter-
ror i sm were  perpetrated again st  the Br it i sh pre sence . Br i t i sh 
mili tary f orc e s  were  f i na l ly removed in the 1 954 Ang l o -Egyp t ian 
Tre aty with comp lete evacuat i on by mid - 1 956 . 3 
After Wor ld War II , Franc e maint ained i t s  co lonial  ho ld 
over Tun i s i a , Mor occ o ,  and Alger ia . However , the e ight t o  
one Mu s l im maj or ity ( over Frenchmen ) stead i ly mov ed t oward 
ind e De ndence . Incre ased t err or i st  act ion s d id not affect 
the immed iate remov al of the Fre nch pre s ence , but conver se ly 
re su lted in France ' s  in crea s ed d e s ire  t o  c omple t e ly c ontrol  
Alger ia . Any f orce which act ively worked t o  a s s i st the Al -
g erian rebe l s  wou ld be v iewed a s  an enemy of t�e French gov -
ernment . 
The shocking p icture generat ed by the N a z i  p er s ecut ion 
and exterminat ion of the Jews emerged at t he end of Wor ld 
War I I . Thi s holoc au st enormou s ly int en s if i ed the Jewi sh 
wor ld movement to create a nat ion stat e . The od or Her z l , a 
Hu ngar ian Jew , wr ote a book , The Jewi sh State ( 1 8 9 6 ) , which 
init iated a j oint p o l it ic a l  and re l ig iou s dr ive for the ere -
at ion of a Jewi sh stat e . The Br i t i sh government wa s sympathetic 
and off ered two ar eas f or the creat i on of a homel and . The 
Jewi sh movement p icked Palest ine as i t s  home land because 
of its anc i e nt re l ig iou s t ie s  t o  the are a .  On N ovember 2 , 
1 9 1 7 , the Bri t i sh government announced the Ba l f our Dec larat i on 
which ou t l ined the format ion of  a Jewi sh home land within a 
Mu s l im maj or ity Pale s tin e  state . 4 
( 4 ) 
J ewish immigrat ion int o the are a grew rap id ly from 1 9 2 0  
to 1 9 4 8 . Bri t i sh checks on the immigrat ion and land purcha s e s  
were t o  no ava i l . The Arabs were not pac i f ied  and actua l l y  
became enrag ed by t h e  rap id inf lux of the Jewi sh peo p l e  i nt o  
Pal e s tine . Intern a l  t e n s ions  mounted and c lashes re sulted 
between the Arab s ,  J ews , and Brit ish . By 1 9 4 7 , G reat Britain 
cou ld no long er ma intain order and announc ed that it wou ld 
withdraw from the are a l e aving the Un i t e d  Nat ions  to t ake  
over the mandate . Before United Nations personn e l  c ou ld set -
tle land di sput e s , the Jewish state of I s ra e l  wa s d e c lared 
5 on May 1 4 , 1 9 4 8 . 
Arab react ion wa s int e n s e . Troop s from I raq , J ordan , 
Syria , and Egypt answered the cha l l e nge . From the f ourteenth 
of May 1 9 4 8  t o  October 1 5 ,  1 9 4 9 , I srae l succe s sf u l ly defended 
her borders aga inst the Arab s . The humil iat ing d efeat had 
immen s e  repercu s s i on s  in Egypt . The lack of adequate weapons , 
supp li e s , and rampant corrupt ion led  t o  a rad ical Free Officers 
movement wh ich deve loped in s id e  the Egypt ian army . The 
leader of thi s movement was a s emicons ervat ive g e neral . G en­
eral Mohammed Nagu ib , support e d  by C o l onel Gamal Abde l  Nas s e r ,  
launched a suc c e s sful revo lut ion on J u l y  2 3 , 1 9 5 2  and ex i l ed 
King Farouk . Na s s er then led a suc c e s sful  coup over G eneral 
Naguib by 1 9 5 4  which s tart ed Egypt d own the p ath of a sem i ­
radical  neutral nat i on . By 1 9 5 6 , Na s s er had become Pre sident 
of Egypt . His  u lt imat e  g oa l s  were the expu l s i on of the We st 
from the area , internal improvement s such as the Aswan High 
( 5 ) 
Dam , the de struct ion of I srae l ,  and his  eventual leader ship 
over a united Arab nation a l i s t  Midd le East . 6 
N a s s er wa s not a bri lliant s t at e sman , a g en iu s , or a 
ma ster strateg i s t . He was a nat i onali s t i c , temperment al 
dictat or who had s e i z ed c ontr o l  of  Egyp t  by t ak i ng the leader­
ship of the 1 95 2  revolut ion from G eneral Naguib . Nas s er 
p laced himse lf at the forefr ont of Egyp t i an nati onalism and 
began t o  c ompete for c ontr o l  of the entire  Arab nat ionali s t  
movement i n  the M iddle East . S ince he had achieved hi s p o s i -
tion by f e eding the nat i onalist ic  spirit o f  Egypt , h e  had t o  
continue to  prove or a t  least demon strate the need for his  
s ervic es . Na s ser a l s o  had to  e nsure cont inued support fr om 
his own government . He used three  tact i c s : focu s ing Egypt ian 
hatred on a d i s tant out s id e  enemy ( Great Br itain ) ;  ec onomi c 
p lans f or intern a l  improvement ; and f ina l ly t o  be , hims e lf , 
the leader of the Arab peop le agains t I srae l .  
Nass er ' s internal p lan e nv i s i oned an improvement of 
Egypt ' s  standard of liv ing . Thi s wou ld be accomp li shed by 
the creat ion of the Aswan High D am .  The first Aswan Dam had 
been f i ni shed in 1 9 0 2  based on an o ld 1 8 8 0's p lan f or us ing 
the water of the N i l e . We s tern techn o logy and f inances  con­
structed the f ir st dam . I t  wa s limited in s i z e , but f or e ­
shadowed what cou ld be  accomp li sh ed i n  the future . Under 
King Farouk , in 1 9 4 7 , p lans for the Aswan High Dam were d e ­
v e l op e d  on ly t o  b e  she lve d  for later u se . After Far ouk had 
been over thr own by G e neral Nagu ib in 1 95 2 , the p lans were 
( 6 ) 
revive d . The Ameri can governme nt , a s  of November 1 9 5 4 ,  agreed 
to  set aside the ne ce s s ary fund s for an E gypt ian eng ine ering 
sur vey for the crea t i on of the darn . The prop o s e d  darn wou ld 
increase the e lectric p ower of E gypt e ight t ime s and add one ­
third more land f or irr ig ation . This wou ld s t art Egypt ' s  
indu s trial growth off t o  a s tr ong start . Nas s er re ali z ed it  
wou ld be an advantage t o  have we s t ern f inanc i a l  a s s i st ance . 
It  wou ld strengthen E gypt ' s  credit on the wor ld market and 
generate an e n l arged j ob fund t o  d e crea s e  it s s eriou s  unern-
7 p loyrnent prob lem s . 
Nas s er u s e d  the darn a s  a propaganda in strument of the 
highe s t  impact to cement hi s p o s ition of p ower . Nas ser began 
to dire ct he ated ant i -Jewi s h  Egyp t ian p a s s ions against I srae l .  
He d enied I srae l ' s right t o  ex i s t  a s  a nat i on , p ushed for con­
tinued pres sure against I srae l , and cal led f or the ext ermina­
tion of I srae l from Arab t err itory . The ma in avenue u s ed 
for d i s s eminating Nas ser ' s  p o l i c i e s  wa s the V oice  of Cairo . 
He u sed thi s g overnme nt c ontr o l led  rad i o  s tat ion t o  s pread 
his  polic i e s  throughout the Arab wor ld . I t s  fa l s e  and inf lam-
rnat ory mes sage s became the g o s p e l  of the Arab mas s e s . Becau s e  
o f  i t s  us e ,  Na s s er and Egypt bec ame the embodiment of the 
Arab s ' ant i - I srae l h o s t i l ity . His u s e  of the ant i - I srae li 
broad c a st s , aimed at the Arab wor ld , gained the p opu lar support 
of the Egypt ian ma s s e s . The V oice  of C a iro was not on ly u s e d  
by Nas s er t o  gain s tand ing in  the Arab wor ld regarding I srae l ,  
but a l s o  to  se i z e  the reigns of the Arab nat i o na l i s t  movement . 
Na s ser attempted to  remake the Midd le E as t  into a united unit 
( 7 )  
under his contro l .  He a l s o  u s e d  the V oi c e  t o  s trike out at 
"react ionary" Arab government s ,  pro -we s tern Arab g overnment s ,  
and c o lonia l Arab g overnment s . 8 
Reactionary Arab g overnme nt s , such a s  S audi Arabi a ,  
were in rea lity government s led by Arab nobi lity which wis hed 
to see Arab unity f o l low a more c ontro l l ed and c on s ervat ive 
growth which wou ld prot e c t  their p o s it ion . Nas s er attempted 
to  und ercut their government s by gaining f or h imse lf a p opular 
f ollowing among the Arab mas s e s .  I n  order t o  s e cure h i s  d e -
s ired p o s i t ion , he cr it icized  the ir ru l e  and c a l led f or the ir 
overthrow .  
Pro -we st ern government s were tho se government s which 
sided with the We s t ern p o s i t i on in int ernat i on a l  affair s 
whi le denigrating the need f or a united Arab s t at e . The 
shining examp le of such a c ountry was Iraq . Iraq , in October 
1 9 5 5 , j oined the Baghdad Pac t . I t  was created by United S t at e s  
Secretary of S tate , John F o st er Du l le s , and s igned by Iraq , 
Iran , Turkey ,  P akistan , and Bri tain . F or S ecr etary D u l le s ,  
it marke d the c omp let ion of the enc irc lement of the S oviet 
Uni on and communi sm in  genera l . For Na s ser , it  marked the 
creat ion of a mi litar i ly and e c on omic a l ly we s tern s upported 
Arab s tate which could remove the leader ship of Arab unity 
from his contro l .  Therefore , he u s ed the V o i c e  to  cau s e  
unre s t  in  a n  attempt to  overthrow Iraq ' s Prime Mini ster Nuri 
Es  S aid who on ly saved h i s  p o s ition by having n ine past prime 
mini s t er s  p er suade  King F a i s a l  t o  sign the Baghdad Treaty . 9 
( 8 ) 
Nas ser a l s o  s truck out at c o lon i a l  Arab government s .  
The s e  were  government s contr o l led mainly by European nations . 
Algeria was a prime examp le due t o  the large French minority 
and sub s e quent French influence . Nas s er used the Voice  to 
pr omote a s s a s s inat ion s ,  an int ernal p o l it i c a l  revolt , and 
gueri lla warfare again s t  French troop s . Egypt a l s o  trained 
and s upplied guer i l la band s . Needle s s  to  say , the French 
government did not at a l l  care for Nas s er ' s  act i on s  and looked 
f t b t h. 1 0  or a way o re u im . 
N ass er committed h i s  act i on s  main ly at We s tern expe ns e .  
The We s t  became a favorit e t arget due t o  t he h i s tory of French 
and Bri t i s h  c o lonial ru le , and the creati on of Isra e l  by the 
Brit i s h  governme nt . His attacks were direct ed from his  dual 
posit i on of se lf -app ointed s p oke sman f or Arab nat i onalism and 
as a neutral nati on . E gypt ' s  p o s i t i on of a neutral nati on 
wa s l inked with Yug o s lavi a , under Pre s ident Mar sha l T i t o , 
and I ndia , under Prime Mini s t er Jawahar la l Nehru and Mini s t er 
without port f o l i o  V .  K .  Kri shna Menon . The I ndian l ink wou ld 
hopefu ll y  g ive  Nas s er a mora l i s t i c  voice  i n  the United Nat i on s  
t o  promot e  h i s  at tacks on the We s t . 
Nas s er a l s o  t ook a s trong s t and again s t  c ommuni sm . He 
suppr e s s e d  the Egyp t i an C ommuni s t  P arty by out lawing its  
exis tence and by arr e s ting i t s  member s .  Na s s er und ers t ood 
the threat of communi st propaganda to  his c ontro l . E gypt ' s  
standard of living was bare ly above the surviva l lev e l . C om-
mun i s t  i d e ology cou ld be app eal i ng to  the large maj or ity o f  
Egypt ' s  d i s s at i s f i e d  populat i on . B e s id e s  th is  internal threat 
( 9 ) 
and even though communism was in conf lict wi th the Mus lim 
re ligion , Nas s er di stru sted  the p ower of  the S ov i e t  Union . 
He s t i l l  c on s idered the We s t  as a better , more r e l i able , 
bu sine s s  partner . Hence , he internal ly per s e cuted the Egypt ian 
communists  and externa l ly f avored negot iation s with W e s t ern 
. f h" . 1 1 1  nat ions or i s  e c onomic p an s . 
Franc e , in  a s t at e  of de c l i ne , was s t i l l  a c o lonia l 
power in As ia and the Middle East . France c ontr o l led  Algeri a ' s 
fore ign re lat ion s , and a s  a re s u lt , ex erc i s ed a dominat ing 
inf luence over the Alger ian p opulat i on . S uch inf lu ence re -
sulted from a mot i on pas s e d  by the French Const ituent As s embly 
in 1 9 4 6 c a l ling for the gradual  a s s imilation of Algeria int o 
France proper . Th is moti on was further s treng thened by al lowing 
the Algerian A s s emb ly to conduct s ome minor reforms so  as  to 
pacify the Mus l im nat io n a li s t s . A revolt aga inst  French 
colonial  control s tart ed in late 1 9 5 0 . The p o li ti c a l  arm 
of the revolt , the National Liberat i o n  Front ( F . L . N . ) ,wa s  
headquartered i n  Cair o , Egypt . The revolt wa s further aided 
by the Bandung Conference of neutral nat i o n s  in  Apri l ,  1 9 5 5 . 
Thi s c onference wa s forme d t o  show neutral s o l i dar ity against  
the sup erp ower s and  t o  a s s i s t  third world c ountr i e s  in gain -
i ng po litical i ndependence . Arab nat i ona l i s t s  further fue led 
the Algerian rev o lt becau s e  of  ant icoloni s t  pas s i on s  through -
1 2  out the Arab wor ld . 
France a l s o  labored under internal problems caused by 
the d e feat in I ndochina in 1 9 5 4 ,  and the fai lure t o  e nact it s 
comprehe n s ive European defense  p lan . On F ebruary 1 ,  1 9 5 6 , 
( 1 0 )  
sociali s t  leader , Guy Molle t , succeeded in defeating Premier 
Mendes -France for the Premiership of the government of France . 
As a re s u lt , the policy of " pacification" of the Algerian 
nationali s t s  wou ld be changed . Alger ia ' s  population contained 
rough ly one m i l l i on French-Europ e ans and e ight mi l l i on Mus lim-
Arabs . Standards  of living rap i d ly widened between the two 
group s which caused ant i -French pre s sur e s  t o  erupt . The 
Algerian ant i - c o lonia l movement received much sympathy i n  
many Midd l e  East  state s .  Franc e became one of the two 
13 favor ite " We stern" target s .  
Great Br itain , even though it  had remove d  the French 
typ e of admini s trat ive c ontro l ,  s t i l l  exerc i s ed its inf luenc e 
in the Mid d le E a s t  through three  means : i . e . , diplomat ic 
treat i e s , ec onomic support , and mil itary bas e s . D ue t o  thi s 
inf luenc e , Great Br itain became tainted with the " We s t ern 
Imper iali s t s "  image u s e d  by the Arab national i s t s . 
Great Britain maintained various treat i e s  wi th some of 
the Midd le E a s t  countr i e s . Thes e treat i es were e ither for 
mil it ary defensive purp o s e s  or for ec onomic trade rea s on s . 
One ear ly examp le of a mi l itary agreement wa s the Baghdad 
Pact in February of 1 955 .  The Pact s e cured the right of the 
Britis h  to  k eep its air ba s e s  to  comp l ement i t s  North At lant ic  
Treaty Organi zat ion ( NATO ) s trength . Under thi s treaty , 
economic aid , ma inly fr om the Unit ed  State s ,  would be given 
to the s i gnator i e s  to help strengthen their mi l itary forces  
d . 1 4  an economi e s . 
( 1 1 )  
Another s imi lar treaty r e la t ionship ex i sted between the 
Arab state of Jordan and Great Bri t a in . Britain maintained 
an air bas e  and two mil itary ba s e s  in Jordan . I n  add it ion 
to thi s , Britain prov ided mil l io n s  in aid to Jordan ' s  weak 
economy . Jordan needed thi s aid to  ma intain i t s  economy on  
a sure foot i ng . I t  ne eded Bri t i s h  military s trength t o  keep 
Jordan safe from I srae l and her surround ing Arab s i s t er s t at e s . 
Jord an ' s  government did not tru s t  the other s tate s ' amibit ions 
regarding her border s and was e spec ial ly worr ied by Na s ser ' s  
1 .  . d . 1 5  po i ci e s  an action s . 
Great Britain had an important treaty re lat i on ship with 
Egypt . Thi s  re lation ship gave Br itain a large mili tary base 
along the canal in ord er to insure it s safety , p lus  a large 
controlling inter e s t  in the affairs of the canal it s e lf . The 
treaty had bee n  formed i n  the 1 8 8 8  Con s t antinop l e  C onvent i on . 
Thi s convent ion de s ignat ed the canal a s  an inter nati onal water -
way , made it  free t o  nav igate in  p eace and war , and guaranteed 
its maintenance . Bri t i s h  ac cept ance o f  the Baghdad Pact and 
change s  in  the canal treaty were the beg inning of Britain ' s  
problems in the Middle East  and i t s  s trained re lations with 
the United S tate s . Change s  i n  the canal treaty were initiated 
by the Unite d  State s S e cretary of S tate , D ean Ache son , in  
1 9 5 2  with King F arouk . S e cretary of Stat e , John Foster Dulle s , 
in 1 9 5 4 ,  pres sur ed Britain into changing the mi l itary and 
ma int enance aspects  of the C on s t antinople C onvent ion on July 2 7 ,  
1 9 5 4  in the Ang lo-E gypt ian agre eme nt . Under this  agreement , 
Great Britain remov ed e i ghty thou sand m i l it ary troop s from 
( 12 )  
the base by July 13 , 1 956 . The canal ' s  importance  t o  Gr eat 
Britain wa s due to  the fact that Britain ' s  and Europe ' s  
vital o i l  supply pas sed through it . 1 6  
Britain ' s  economic r e lations  with the Midd le East nat ions 
were for the main purp o s e  of s e curing o i l  supp l i e s .  The thre e 
maj or o i l  produc ing nat io n s  in the Midd le  E a s t  wer e the Arab 
countr i e s  of Iraq and Saudi Arabia and the nation of Iran . 
Trans -Arabi an pipe l ines  went e i ther t o  port s in the Pers ian 
Gulf or through the countr i e s  of  Israe l , Jordan , Syr i a , and 
Lebanon . P er s ian Gulf  re finer i e s  s hipped the ir o i l  by t ankers 
through the Suez Cana l to  Europ e . Thi s  path wa s favored over 
the l o nger j ourney around the Cape of Afri ca . The p ip e l in e s  
le ading i n t o  t h e  other countries to the Med i terranean port s 
trave led mai n ly through Arab countr i e s . A sma l l  port ion of 
the line went through I srae l .  The s e  p ip e l ine s ex i s t e d  under 
the p erm i s s i on of  the var ious  countr i e s . Britain se cured 
favorable treat i e s  by supp lying economic aid t o  the s e  countries  
to keep th e lines  open . 1 7  
Both Britain and Franc e , due t o  the ir need for o i l  sup-
p l ier s , maintained their i nter e s t s  in the Midd l e  East . Hence , 
the p o l it i c a l  comp o s i t i on s  of the Middle East  countr i e s  wer e 
of great imp ortance to the two . Any threat t o  thi s  as pect 
of the Middle East  cou ld d i srup t the p ipe lines  or the cana l . 
Mi litant ag gre s s ive nationa l i sm , whi ch Nas s er grew t o  repre -
sent , threat ened We s tern i nt er e s t s  in the area . The United 
State s ,  under Dul l e s ' for e ign p o l i cy , downp layed the importanc e 
of the economic a s pect s of the area whi l e  empha s i z i ng the 
· f b. s · · f d . 1 8  importance o cur ing ov i e t  communism rom exp an ing . 
( 1 3 )  
Midd le East  nation s d i d  not have the s ame pri ori tie s 
of France and Br itain ,  and even t o  a l e s s er degre e , the con­
cerns of Dul l e s  and the Uni ted S tate s . Ma j or factor s  in  the 
Middle East  pol i c i e s  were  Arab n ationali sm and ant i - I srae l 
sentiment s . Leader ship of t he Arab nat ion a l i s t  movement 
involved both Nas ser ' s  new Egypt and the e stabli shed Arab 
monarchie s .  I n  order to  gain contro l ,  a leader had t o  prove 
his importance to the mas s e s . Thi s led t o  an e conomic s trug ­
g le between the two s id e s . The s i d e  that could strengthen 
the social p o s ition of the Arab peop l e  and mi l i t ar i ly re­
gain l o s t  Arab d ignity from a she s of previ ou s  defeat s  at 
the haricts 6f-Isra�l would be the leader . 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq did thi s by channel ling some of 
the o i l  revenues  into their e c onomie s  to  improve their standards  
of  l iv i ng . The ir o i l  gave them large sums o f  money t o  deve lop 
re lief and improvement p lans . Syr i a , Lebanon , and J ordan 
used the revenue created by the t o l l s  on the o i l  pipe line s . 
I n  addition , Jordan a l s o  relied on e conomic ai d from Great 
Britain to  improve its e conomy . Egypt had to  r e ly on what­
ever economic aid it could get from the  We s t  and on profit s 
from i t s  agricu lture export s . T o  make up for h i s  l imited 
economic me ans o f  improveme nt , Na s s er c oncentrated on  scoring 
propaganda points with the Aswan High Dam . Egyptian and 
Arab ma s s e s saw the dam as an image of future greatne s s . The 
Arab ma s s e s  were responsive to un ity , revenge against  I s rae l ,  
and t o  a l e s s er extent , the ant i - imperi a l i s t  Wes t ern propa­
ganda . Nas ser , in  his work , Egypt ' s  Liberat ion : The Phi l o s ophy 
( 1 4 )  
of the Revo lut i on , provided a general summat i on of  h i s  Arab 
po licy and potential pres sure po int s to  be  u s ed against  
Europe which Britain and France he ld as cr i t i cal to  the ir 
surviva l . Na s s er ' s  int ent ion was t o  unite a l l  o f  the Arab 
countr i e s . The next  step would be the domi nation of the 
African continent by the Arab s , and fina l ly , the unit ing of  
all  I s lami c people  throughout the  wor ld t o  offset  the  
superp ower s .  The pre s sure point s men t i oned wer e the us e of 
oi l and control of the avenue s which the oil had to  trave l 
through : i . e . , p i p e l i ne s  and the cana 1 . 1 9  
Nas s er , al s o ,  hinted at the effects  whi ch could be 
achieved if the Arab nation s united to c ontrol  o i l  production 
and s a le s . An art i c l e  pub li shed by the Univer s ity o f  Ch icago 
was h i s  source for thi s insp irat ion . Thi s  art i c le pres ented 
the various costs  of the o i l  comp ani e s  in deve loping produ c ­
tive we l l s  and refined o i l . Accordi ng t o  Nas s er , t h e  cheap 
cost and large amount of  product i on availab le in the Middle 
East shi fted the center of wor ld oil dom inat ion from the 
Unit ed  S t at e s  to the Middle East . Arab c ountri e s  mus t  uni t e  
i n  order t o  contro l  o i l  product i on . Th i s  wou ld generate a 
strong p ower base for the Arab countrie s , from which they 
cou ld influence wor ld p o l i t i c s . 2 0  
The p i p e l i ne and the canal could thu s act a s  reigns on the 
actions  of Europe which wa s dependent on the o i l  suppl y . I f  
the reign s  wer e t i ghtened , the c anal ' s  u s e  r e s tricted , or 
p ipel ines c l o s e d , l e s s o il would  f low to Europ e . I f  loos ened , 
mor e o i l  would f low t o  E urope . The E uropean countr i e s  could be 
influenced and even d ictat e d  t o  becau s e  of  the ir need for o i l . 
(1 5 )  
Britain and France r ea l i zed where their o i l  supp l i e s  
were located and how it f lowe d to them . I n  Wor ld War I I , 
Br itain ex ert e d  tremendou s effort s in prot ec ting the canal 
whi le fight i ng f or the ev entual expu l s i on of Rommel and the 
German Army from North Afr i c a . Br itain had t o  save it s ma i n  
2 1  
art ery o f  pre -Wor ld War I I  trade . 
France ' s  main ar ea of int er e s t  wa s not the canal , which 
was or ig ina l ly built and f i nanced by Franc e and Br itain , but 
to maintain it s hold on Alger ia which Nas ser thr eatened . 
Franc e s ought t o  remov e the main out s i d e  inf lu ence which 
funded , trained , and gave verbal support t o  the Alg erian r ebe l 
cau s e . Na s s er wa s that influence and source of aid . Fran c e  
hoped f o r  an excus e t o  rea s s ert i t s  nat ional and world pr e s t ig e  
by s t opping Nas s e r ' s  aim s  and regaining contro l of  Alger ia . 
Such wa s the g eneral background whi ch l ed t o  c anc e l lat i on 
of Amer i c an fund ing for the Aswan High Dam and the s e i zur e 
of the Sue z Cana l . The f ir s t  ev ent whi ch l ed t o  We s t ern 
s o l idar ity wa s Na s s er ' s  arms pur cha se  from communi st nat ions 
in the autumn of 1 9 55 . 
Chapter Two ( 1 6 ) 
The Cracks W id en i n  Mid d le East  Re lat ions 
Premier N a s s er , on September 2 7 , 1 9 5 5 ,  public ly announc ed 
that he  had purcha sed and received arm s  from the  Soviet  Union 
through C z echo s lovakia . It wa s a bombshe ll  and a l so a s u s -
pected t ruth . Informat ion fr om various  s ource s had f i lt ered 
into the We s t ern g overnment s ,  warning of Na s s er ' s  Soviet nego­
tiat ion s . Un ited S tat e s  S e cretary of S tate Du l l e s  fai l ed 
to realize  what Nas ser was up t o  once the United S tate s re ­
fus ed t o  s e l l  h im arm s . Na s s er went t o  the only source wh ich 
cou ld supply the we apons he needed to r e a l i z e  his dream of 
def eat ing I srae l  and s ecur ing the l e ader ship of Arab nat i on al ­
ism . Arab mas s e s  saw in  Nas s er an abi l it y  t o  overr ide the 
inf luenc e of  the We st and s e cure the nece s s ar y  weapons  for 
1 suc c e s s .  
This  move had wider int ernati on a l  repurcu s s ions than 
the init ial shock wave s t hroughout the Midd le E a st , f or it 
marked a succe s sfu l attempt by the Soviet U n i on to bre e ch 
We s t ern c ontai nment . S e cretary Dulles  was , pr i or to  Na s s er ' s  
arms d eal , in the proce s s  of weaving h i s  web of cont ainment . 
He had s e cured the creat ion of  the Baghdad P act in June of 
1 9 5 5 . This pact when comb i ne d  with Acheson ' s  and Truman ' s  
North At lant ic  Treaty Organi zat ion , and the 1 9 5 4  S outh East 
As ian Treaty Organi z at i on linked the U n it ed S tate s ,  C anada , 
Gre at Brit ain , I c e land , P ortuga l ,  Denmark , Lux embourg , Norway , 
Be lg ium ,  the Nether land s ,  I t a ly , Franc e , Gree c e , T urkey , 
We s t  G ermany , Au stral ia , New Z e a land , Tha i land , Pak i s t an , 
Phi l lipine s ,  Ta iwan , Iraq , and Iran into a hug e , loose ly 
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j o ined r ing around the S ov iet Union and the oth er communi s t  
countr ie s . Nas s er ' s  acceptance o f  Soviet aid a l lowed the 
Soviet Union to st ep over the containment c i rc le g iving the 
Sovi et s their first suc c e s sfu l f oothol d  in the Midd le Ea s t . 2 
The Tr ipartit e Pact o f  1 9 5 0 ,  between Franc e , Great Britain , 
and the United Stat e s , st ipulated that the s e  three were 
again st the u s e  of force in the Midd l e  East and that on ly 
on a cash bas i s  wou ld weapon s be e qua l ly s old to both I srae l 
and any Arab country . The agreement was meant to calm Midd le 
East fear s of one s id e  overp owering the other whi le main ­
tain ing a balanced defens iv e d i s tributi on of we apons . 3 
Thi s  balance wa s di srupted by the Soviet d e a l  with 
Egypt of C zecho s l ovakian weapons for grain . S uch a barter 
deal cau sed Na s s er to u p s et the balance and ri s k  peace in  
the Midd le East . B e s id e s  d i srupting the statu s quo , it a l s o  
introduced S ov iet i nfluenc e int o an area whi c h , f or over 
two centurie s , had been bl ocked . 4 
The We st had s ecured its  int ere s t s  and i nfluence in 
the Middle East many year s before . This  was due t o  c o lon i -
zation and dip lomat ic treat i e s . Secretary Du l le s  def ended 
the Tr ipart ite agre ement becau s e  of it s curtai lment of an 
arms race . Dul l e s  used this tactic to prevent I srael or an 
Arab state from deve lop ing a larger inf luence t han the ir 
respective s i z e s  d ictated in the area .  A mi l it ar i ly strong 
country might try to dominate its ne ighbors in  the Midd le 
East . When the arms deal wa s being negot iat ed , Du l le s  received 
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warnings  whi ch he ignored . At the t ime of the announcement , 
he d i d  not rebuke Na s s er or make s trong complaint s  to  the 
Soviet government . In  addit i on , he d i d  not al low I srael t o  
upgrade or expand it s arms purchas e s  to  offs et Egypt , thu s 
heightening fear s of aggre s s ion by Egypt t oward Israe l . 5 
Becau s e  of the growing evidence of Nas s er ' s  inte ntions , 
Israe l became alarmed . The V o i c e  o f  C airo constant l y  ad -
vocated the remov a l  of the J ews by unit ed force and terrori s t  
action s .  The Egypt i an fedayeen , which were guer i l la unit s , 
increased the ir rai d s  int o I s rae l , and communi s t  we apons were 
gradua l ly deployed along the I srae l i  border . I srae l then fol-
lowed two cour se s : the first wa s to  formu late p lans f or a 
preemp t ive s trike , and the second was t o  s ecure arms , e ither 
out s id e  of the Tr ipart ite  countr i e s  or with t hem , in  vio la-
. f h . 6 tion o t e ir agreeme nt . 
S ecretary Du lles ' ,  and consequent ly the State D ep art-
ment ' s , view of I s ra e l ' s  p os ition was one of United Nat i on s ' 
re spons ibi l ity . Dulles  be lieved i f  entrusted  t o  the Unit ed  
Nation s ,  I srael shou ld not  worry about her neighbor s and the 
Soviets  could  then have a contr o l le d  say in the Middle East . 
He did not see  n ight raids of Arab gueri l la unit s on I srae l 
as act s  of aggre s s ion by any Arab stat e . Furthermor e , he 
did not think the Soviet Un ion wou ld back Na s s er ' s  d ome s t i c  
or foreign p o l i c ie s j u s t  becau s e  they had s o ld him arms . 7 
Du l l e s ' v iew of where Amer ica ' s  inter e s t s  lay i n  th e 
Middle East and how best  t o  pres erve the achievement of 
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the s e  intere s t s  became the p o l icy whi ch the S tate D epartment 
followed and Pre s i d ent E i s e nhower accept ed . Mo st politicians 
bring into  their offices  the ir own per sonal charact eri s t i c s  
and v iews o f  the wor ld . S e cretary Du l l e s  was no exc ept ion but 
moreover an extreme embod iment of such a p o l i t i c ian . He 
brought int o  the S tate Department and the White  Hou s e  h i s  
Calvin i s t i c  ethics and moral  evalu at ions of t h e  vari ou s 
polit ical ent i t i e s  o f  the world . E i s enhower al lowed Dul le s  
to v irtua l ly d ictate  United S tate s ' foreign p o l i cy and even 
attended Du l le s ' church , a lthough he had never been a very 
rel igi ou s man . Du l l e s  became the embodiment o f  America ' s  
fore ign p o l i cy in the 1 9 5 0 ' s .  Dul le s  viewed the Soviet 
Union with s u s pi c i on.and dis tru s t . He pub l ic l y  as se s sed , 
interpret ed , and d e s p i s e d  every act ion of Soviet communi sm . 8 
Du l l e s  contended that the United Stat e s  had t o  exerc is e 
moral re sponsibi lity in the Middle E a s t . As a r e sult , Dulles  
tri ed t o  improve the West ' s  image in  the area . He d e s p i s e d  
colon ia l i sm and rea l i z ed t h e  gains that Amer i ca could achieve 
if the Unit ed Stat e s  showed Arab nat i onali s t s  that America 
also d i s approved of French and Bri t i s h  p o s ition s in the area . 
His first s tep s e cured Brit ish m i l itary withdrawa l from i t s  
Sue z base . Dul le s  bel ieved t h e  United Stat e s  could improve 
the re lat io n s  of its a l l i e s  with the Arab countri e s , thereby 
end ing ho s t i li t i e s  t oward the We st whi l e  all owing We s t ern in­
f luence to  become s tronger . Thi s wou ld increase  the abi l ity 
of the We st to  hop e fu l ly lock out Soviet i n f lu ence from the ar ea . 9 
--( 2 0 )  
The s ituat ion which Du l l e s  inher ited from Truman ' s  
former Secretary of  State Acheson in regards to  the Midd l e  
Ea st was a s  f o l lows : Egypt wa s in  the avant garde of  Arab 
nationa l ism , and i t s  greate st d i s pute with the We st ern po s it io n  
was due t o  Br i t i sh occupat ion which had begun in  the late 
1 8 8 0 ' s .  In  1 936 , the Anglo -Egypt ian treaty virtua l ly removed 
Bri t i s h  occupat i on from Egypt . The conc e s s ion for the Brit i s h  
withdrawal wa s a large mi l itary base  at the S u e z  Cana l . In  
1 9 51 , the Unit ed S tates  State  D epartment e nc ouraged Egypt to  
abrogate the  treat y , but th i s  att empt failed and  resulted in 
Bri t i sh Fore ign S e cretary S ir Anthony Eden d i s approving of  
the State Department ' s  act i on s , Egypt ian acts  o f  sabotage , 
and a rej ection of a Brit i sh p lan for a Mid d l e  East Command 
alliance of Great Br itain , Franc e ,  the United S tate s , and 
Egypt f or a l l  of the Middle East . 1 0  
United State s ' pl icy , in r eference t o  Franc e ,  wa s one 
of h e s itant acceptanc e .  The United Stat e s  government con ­
sidered Algeria t o  be  a prot ectorate o f  Franc e . The Unit e d  
State s d id not l ike  French contr o l  of  Tuni s ia and Morocc o .  
The only pre s sure p laced  on France wa s to  change the ir 
poli c i e s  i n  tho se  two countri e s . 
When Dul le s ent ered the State Department , he pre s s ed 
for Br it i sh withdrawa l fr om the Suez  bas e . He pub l i c ly ac­
cepted the rights o f  France to  suppre s s  the ant i -co lonial , 
rad ical rev o lt in  Algeria and i t s  contr o l  over it s gov ernment . 
Furthermore , he wanted the cre ation of a " northern t i er "  
against communism which , i n  fact , eventua l ly became the 
( 2 1 )  
Baghdad Pact . Dul le s , in early 1 953 , bec ame the f ir s t  S e c -
retary of S t a t e  t o  actually t our t h e  Middle East  and S outh 
As ia  for the purpo s e  of a s s e s s ing the dome s t i c  problems of 
thos e  areas and a l s o  to show a s ign of American fri endship 
for the new third world nati on s . 1 1  
Thi s t our w a s  imp ortant for h i s  pub lic pre s s  r e l e a s e  of 
his impr e s s i on s  of each nation and general conclu s i on s  show 
some very ac curate repre s entat ion s . He s aw the need t o  
stimu late Midd le E a s t  ec onomi es  b y  inv e s t i ng large amount s 
of Unit ed States aid in  irrigation , communication , and hous ing 
proj ects . In  fact , he heav i ly s tres sed the moral respon s ib i -
lity of t h e  Unite d  S t ate s i n  reference t o  improving t h e  food 
produc t ion of the various area s . He came acro s s  in  the pre s s  
release a s  favorably accept ing the vari ous  government s o f  
the twelve countr i e s  h e  v i s ited ev en though s ome wer e avowed 
1 . d h b . d . . . f ld 1 . . 1 2  neutra s i n  regar s t o  t e ipo lar iv i s ion o wor po i t i c s . 
Dulles ' init i a l ly favorable impres s i on s  o f  the s e  nations 
underwent a dra s t i c  rever sal be fore 1 956 . At f ir s t , he 
equated any noncommuni s t  nation a s  being an acceptable gov -
ernment worthy of American a s s i s t ance . By 1 956 , he vi ewed 
any neutral nat ion , n on aligned with America or a We s t ern 
European power , a s  be ing an enemy of the United S tat e s . I f  
a nation was ne ither a friend o f  the Unit e d  S tat es  and i t s  
allies , nor a n  enemy o f  t h e  Soviet Union , it wa s a n  indirect 
enemy . The neutra l nation s were growing in  power i n  the 
United Nat ion s . They might eventual ly pres en t  a formi dable 
( 2 2 )  
oppo s i t ion bloc t o  Wes tern proposa l s . Neutral nat ions wou ld 
pursue a political  course which favored their intere s t s  with 
the hope of making the Uni t e d  Nat ions and int ernat i onal po l i -
tics a thre e - s ided configurat ion . This  p ercept ion o f  the 
emerg ing third world sharp l y  affected Dul le s ' hand ling of  
Na s s er ' s p o l i ci e s . 
Dulles  obviou s l y  courte d  Egypt ian favorit ism t o  gain 
Arab ac ceptanc e . Hi s f irst move opened negot iat ions between 
Britain and Egypt . He persuaded the Brit i sh g overnment 
to evacuate it s m i l itary and technical s taffs  from i t s  
Sue z  ba s e . The treaty was s igned i n  1 9 5 4  and the Bri t i sh 
withdrawa l wa s comp le t e d  by June 13 , 1 9 5 6 .  I t  s t ip ulated 
that Egypt ian t e chn i c i ans wou ld maintain the bas e to  insure 
its u s e abi lity for a period of seven years . Thi s s t ipulation 
stated that Brit i sh troop s c ou ld re enter the bas e  up t o  s even 
years if  Egyp t  and/or the safety o f  the canal wa s threatened 
by an out s ide  aggre s sor . After Du l le s  comp l e t e d  this med i -
at ion , h e  exp ected E gypt ian and Arab nat ionalism t o  swing i n  
f f A . l "  . 13 avor o me ric an p o  i c i e s . 
Premier Na s s er repre sented a v i o lent , compet it ive  nat i on -
ali sm which from h i s  track record of  advocat i ng I srae l ' s  d e -
struc t ion , p o l i t i cal as s a s s i nat i on s , and gueri lla warfare , 
did not portray an ind iv idual wh ich cou l d  be dealt with on  
a mora l i s t i c  leve l .  The s e  p ersona l  charact eri s t i c s  o f  Na s s er 
wou ld cause Du lles  great compl ications in hand l i ng the 
future s ituat i on s . 
( 23 )  
Du l le s ' Middle E a s t  tour led h im t o  r e a l i z e  that e c onomic 
aid and irr igat i onal programs mus t  be undertaken on a l arge 
scale bas i s . He s t arted negot iat ions which re sulted in  an 
init ial  American commitment to fund an Aswan Dam proj ect 
with Egypt on November 2 0 , 1 9 5 4 . The t iming wa s important 
becau s e  it pre ceded Na s s er ' s  attempt to purcha s e  arms from 
the Wes t . Dul l e s  committed financ ial  a s s i s tance f or an en-
gine ering survey of the dam s it e . Du l l e s  lat er init iat ed 
a tripar t i t e  back i ng for the  irrigati on proj e c t . He formu-
lated a thre e way l oan agr e ement between the United S tate s ,  
the Wor ld Bank , and Great Br itain . They wou ld j ointly l oan 
. . d f . . 1 " d  E 1 4  the neces sary t e chnicians an i nancia a i  t o  gypt . 
Characteri s t ic s  o f  the l oan were thoroughly evaluat ed 
by the Wor ld Bank . I t s  pre s id ent wa s Eugen e  B lack , who wou ld 
not accept the loan unle s s a thorough eva luat ion of Egypt ' s  
economic stab i l ity proved t o  be  ad equat e t o  r ep ay the loan . 
After B lack a s s e s s ed the n e ce s s ary informati o n , he accepted 
Du ll e s ' offer of  part ic ipat i on . 15 
Great Britain a l s o  accepted the loan prop o s a l  but made 
its part ic ipat ion dependent on Amer ica ' s  actions . I f  the 
United S tat es  part ic ipat ed , so too wou ld Britain . If the 
Unit ed States  d id not part i c ip at e , Great Brit ain c ould  not 
produc e the amount of  c ap i t a l  r equired for the pro j ect . 
Great Britain rea l i z ed that b e s i d e s  h e lp ing Egypt ' s  s o c ial  
and e c onomic condition s , it  would  improve Great Britain ' s  
Middle Eas t  image . I t  wa s a l s o  hoped  that �hi s aid would 
keep Na s s er in  l ine with t he We st . The us e of d o l lar -
( 2 4 )  
pound dip lomacy hopefu l ly wou ld have a deep impact on  the 
16 polit ical p o l i c i e s  of the receiv ing country . 
Dul l e s  a l s o  hoped to  rec e ive  Nasser ' s  part ic ipat i o n  i n  
the Baghdad Pact with Great Brit ain , Iran , Paki stan , Turke y , 
and Iraq which was s igned in 1 955 . Dulles  had g iven en-
couraging pre s s s tat ement s hint ing to  Egypt ' s  favorable ac-
ceptance o f  the Pac t . To  further gre a s e  the whe e l s  o f  it s 
pa s sage , he gave Nas s er a total of forty mil lion i n  op en a i d . 
Na s ser not only t ook the aid and turned down the Pact , but 
also  verba lly attacked the Pact as be ing a t o o l  of We s t ern 
dominat ion . He cal led f or , through the V o i c e , the violent 
re j ect ion of tho s e  who accepted the Pac t . This  was due t o  
N ' d b h 1 . f A b . 1°  1 7  a s ser s nee  t o  ecome t e ce ntra ax i s  o ra nat iona i sm .  
S ecretary Du l l e s  wa s not p le a s ed with Nas s er ' s  act ions  
but d id compensat e  America ' s  p olicy by try ing to  work around 
the Baghdad Pact . To keep a favorable image and an open 
situat ion f or further Ameri can p o l i cy actions in the Midd le 
Eas t , the United Stat e s  government d id not become a s ignator 
of the Baghdad Pact . Thi s  wa s a d irect shock to  �reat Br itain , 
for it s government was count ing on an active Amer ican part i -
cipat ion i n  the defens ive pact . Dul le s ' move of adop t i ng a 
pro -Arab nat iona l i s t  image , c lear o f  European taint , he ightened 
Brit i s h  Pr ime Min i s t er Anthony Eden ' s  di s tru st of any actions 
Du lles  undertook . Dulles  d efended hims elf by inferr ing that 
America would not h inder it s future r e lations with the var ious  
Arab nations by  becoming a signator of the  P act . He conformed 
( 2 5 )  
with the nat ionalism of Nas s er . Thu s the United S tates  became 
a middle man which Dul le s ' a l li e s  and Egypt were suspiciou s  
of and ne ither fully under st ood . 
S ecretary Dul le s  vi ewed the wor ld through mora l i s t i c  
lens e s . H i s  C a lvin i s t ic morality influenced Stat e  Departme nt 
policy . Dul le s ' p o l i c i e s  wer e f i ne when the s ituat ion was 
between s o  c a l led  " Chri s t ian" c ountr ie s . I t  i s  difficult to 
channe l  the f ore ign pol icy o f  a c ountry a lo ng a Chri s t ian 
viewp oint when dealing wi th t he Mus l im wor ld of the Mid d le 
East . The Crusad e s  and Western c o lonial i z at ion d i d  not d e ­
velop a favorable v i e w  o f  Chri s t ian princ iples in  action . 
Arab-Mu s l im national ism , based on re l i g ious  b e l i e f s  o f  
an e y e  for a n  e ye , turne d t h e  ar ea int o a hotbed . V io l ence , 
if deeme d a u s e fu l  mean s t o  a d e s ired end , was therefore 
used . Dulles  would not cons ider a gent leman ' s  agr eement as 
bind ing when dealing with Nas s er , nor wou ld he consider that 
a treaty be v i ewed as s acred . Nasser he ld Mach iave l l ian 
views regar d ing the u s e  of treat ies . Treat i e s  were u s e ful 
to achieve a d e s ired goa l  and , once having been s e cured , 
the treaty wa s no longer o f  any va lue . Henc e , Na s s er ' s  
actions and p o l i c i e s  were not in  the s ame v e i n  as Dul le s ' .  
Any acti ons regard ing Egypt had to  be rationally secured s o  
as t o  remove the pas s ion o f  moral viewpo int s .  
Having succ e s s fu lly gained forty mi l lion from America 
whi le ignoring the treat y  of Baghdad , Na s s er turned to  the 
problem of Egypt ' s  mi l it ary re cord . He wanted t o  rebu i ld 
( 2 6 )  
Egypt ' s  mi litary force s and cau se  a Phoenix- like rebirth 
of Egypt ' s  image throughout the Middle E a s t . To do  th i s , 
weapons o f  modern capabi lity in large quant i t i e s  had to  be 
secure d .  He again turned to  the We s t . 1 8  once 
The United S tate s wa s the only acceptable country ; 
Nasser cou ld not deal  with the c o l on i z ing French , and the 
Brit i sh government i gnored his attemp t s . Eventually Na s s er 
wou ld become entrapp ed by his  own propaganda . Amer ica wa s 
the on ly ma j or We s t ern country which had not been s trong ly 
crit i c i z ed by Nas s er . Therefor e , he turned t o  the United 
Stat e s  t o  acqu ire the nece s s ary amount of modern weapons 
needed t o  achie ve Egypt ' s  domi nance in  the Middle East . 
Egypt ' s  abi l ity t o  pay on a cash bas i s  wa s h indered by it s 
weak economy , s o  the only other avenue was through a barter 
deal o f  Egypt ian agr icultural export s ( o f  which cotton was 
the main product ) f or the d e s ired weapon s . 
Du l l e s  did not accept the deal due to three ma]or reasons.  
The first d ealt with his  mor a l  viewpoint of the s ituation . 
He s tated that the Unit e d  S tat e s  wou ld not start an arms 
race i n  the Middle E a s t  nor d i srupt the peace achi eved 
by the Tripartite  Pact . Du l l e s  v iewed supplying Na s s er with 
we apons as a change in  the balance of p ower , re sult ing in 
one c ountry overreaching it s ge ographic  inf luenc e by u s ing 
its mi litary might, Egypt need not have fear of  I srae l i f  
the Unit ed  Nat i on s  was al lowed t o  c ontrol the area . Premi er 
Na s s er could not under s tand D u l le s ' moral i s t i c  po s it ion . 
( 2 7 )  
For him , E gypt had t o  c lean its  image in  the eyes o f  the Midd le 
Ea st. The weap ons wou ld be  u s ed to  ha lt any p lans I srae l 
might have  of expanding her t err i t ory at Egypt ' s  exp ens e. 
In addition to  thi s , t he Unit ed Nations  gav e I srae l i t s  
birth o n  Arab s o i l  and ther e for e c o u l d  n o t  be tru s t ed t o  
curtail I srae l ' s  aggres sivene s s .19 
Dul le s ' s e c ond reason for not accepting t he arms deal  
was that , due t o  the  creat ion of the Tripart it e Pact and 
the Baghdad Pact , any Middle East country need not fear an 
out s ide  ag gre s sor becau s e  the three  maj or Western nat ions 
had agreed t o  en sure the p eace and prot ect ion of the area. 
The Tripartite agre eme nt , bes ides  maint a in ing the mi l it ary 
ba lance in the area , st ipu lat e d  that the s ignat or i e s  woul d  
opp o s e  any attempt to change any exi s t ing armi st ice lin e s  
by force. Thi s c laus e  a l l owed W e s t ern nat ions the p ower 
of po li cing the area by be ing the only source of  arms and 
the on ly s ource  of  p ermi s s ion for any t erritor i a l  changes. 
Dul l e s  v i ewed thi s a s  a s at i s fact ory s ituat i on which negat ed 
the need for any Middle  East country to secure arms. He 
also  s aw it a s  a calming me s sage for the area ' s  fears of 
I srael and I srae l ' s  fear s of the Arab nat ions.2 0  
Since E gypt was not a member of  the We s t ern-creat ed 
Baghdad Pact , Na s s er rea l i z e d  that Egypt wou ld not  be  prot ected 
by it s c lau s e s .  He a l s o  rea l i z ed that the Trip ar t i t e  Pact 
left out s ome s eriou s  c lau s e s . This Pact came about as 
I srae l ' s  insi st ence with the United State s to set  up a 
( 2 8 )  
check on arms s upp l i e s  to  the are a . The Treaty wa s advan­
tageous to  I srael becau s e  it  mai nta ined the I srae l i  po s i t ion 
of  hav ing super ior arms in both quant ity and quality . 
Finally it d i d  not d i s a l low an Arab contra Ar ab state arms 
rac e . The out come wa s t he Br it i sh creat ion of an Iraqi 
air force and an Egyp t i an air forc e . Great Britain did 
thi s  to  keep i t s  i nf luence in each o f  the two c ountri e s . 
The results  mere ly fue led the strug g l e  f or the leader ship 
of a united Arab nation alist  Middle East . Na s s er naturally 
saw what wa s not covered by the Pact and that I srae l had 
somehow c ircumv ented it s arms checks . This  was due t o  
I srae l ' s  raid int o the Gaza strip in  February o f  1 9 5 5 .  
I srael had succe s s fu l ly conduc t e d  a m i l itary raid u s ing 
super ior , advanced weapons , which re sulted in  a number of 
casualt ies  suffered by the Egypt ian milit ary . I srae l  had 
shown the wor ld that it acquired arms out s ide  of the Tr i­
partite re striction s . Na s s er would not a l low thi s  imba lanc e 
to go  unchecked nor wou ld he al low the humi liat ion t o  remain . 2 1  
The third reason behind Dulle s ' refusal t o  supp ly weapons 
wa s that , due to  the Baghdad and Tripar t i t e  Pact s , the Midd l e  
East need n o t  fear for t h e  s afety of  the area nor t h e  weapons 
balance fr om be ing di srupted by a non-We s t ern nation . Thi s 
meant that the aggr e s s iv e ly expan s io n i s t  p o l i c i e s  o f  Soviet 
domination and influence wou ld be blocked from the area. 
The We s t ern nations  would know what was adequat e t o  def end 
one ' s  terr i t ory and prov ide the larger , more n e c e s sary 
burden of s e cur ing the curtai lment of Soviet expans ion . 2 2  
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Na s ser d i d  not v iew the Soviet Union wi th the same 
regard as Dulles  nor the policy of We s t er n  control of the 
arms rac e i n  the area . Premi er Na s ser did not perce ive the 
Soviet Union as a d irect threat to his country or the area . 
He d i d  not see the Soviet Union a s  be ing able t o  s e cure i t s  
inf luence t o  the ext ent o f  dominat ing a Midd le East country . 
He viewed the Soviet Union as a supporter o f  I srael  s ince 
it wa s the s econd country to dec lare i t s  re cognit ion of the 
state of  I srae l . The large I srae li lobby in America and 
the Soviet recognit ion caused Pre s id ent Truman to recogni ze  
Israe l .  Nas s er b e l i eved the Tripart ite Dec larat i on to  be 
an out s ide creat ion p laced on the sho ulders of the Middle 
East by the We s t . This  view wa s becau s e  not one Arab country 
had s igned the dec larat ion , and a l s o  that I srael had asked 
for it . Nas s er was det ermined , regar d le s s  of the s ource , to 
2 3  secur e arms for Egypt . 
The Soviet Union , even though i t  had not achieved a 
last ing p o s iti on in the Middle East  unt i l  the Egyptian­
C zecho s l ovakian arms deal of 1 9 5 5 ,  had d e s ired the creat ion 
of such an i nt ere st for over two centur i e s . Init ial Rus s ian 
move s  on t he Middle East started in the ear ly 1 7 0 0 ' s  by the 
Ru s s ian T s ar Peter the Great . Under Cather ine the Great , 
in 1 7 6 8 ,  the Ru s s ian navy de feated the Turkish f le et and 
ga ined s tatus as a Black S e a  power by the 17 7 4  Treaty of 
Kut chuk Kaynardj i .  By 1 8 5 3 , T s ar Nicholas I tri ed  t o  
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init iat e the part ition of the " s ick man" of As ia  - - the 
Ott oman Empire. The 18 7 1  London Conference and the 1 8 7 8  
Ber l in Congre s s , which Ru s s i a  part icipat ed in , had sp e c i f i c  
poi nt s regarding the Ott oman Emp ire and t h e  regu lat ions con -
cerni ng the Strait s. The Ang lo-Ru s s ian agreement of 19 0 7  
divided P er s ia into sphere s o f  inf luenc e fur ther moving the 
Ru s s ian imp er i a l i s t  goa l s  of controlling the Midd l e  East and 
d . 2 4  acce s s  to the Me it erranean Sea c l o s er t o  succe ss. 
The main oppo s i t i on to the  expans i on i s t i c  dr ive s of  
the Rus s ian T sar s wa s Great Bri t a in. Britain , from 1 5 8 8 , 
succ e s sfully u s ed it s naval p ower and treaty re lat ion s in 
halt ing Ru s s ia ' s  drive f or a year -round s e a  port in the 
Midd le East. Thi s abi l ity of Great Br itain was s everely 
strained by the advent of Wor ld War I, and as a r e s ult , 
conc e s s ions were made  which gave the Ru s s ian T s ar , Ni cho las 
I I , the po s s ib i lity of rea l i z ing the T s ar i st imp er i a l i s t i c  
goal o f  control  in the M i d d l e  E a s t  and t h e  Medit erranean 
2 5  Sea. 
Great Britain and France accepted th e c laims of Ru s s i a  
for both shor es  o f  the Bos phoru s , the D ardane l l e s , the annex -
ation of Constantinople , and the Sea o f  Marmara i n  March 
of 1 9 15 for Ru s s ia ' s  mi l it ary a s s i s t ance. The succe s s  o f  
two centur i e s  of Ru s s ian expans ion i s t ic goals  wa s t o s s ed 
away two year s later by the 19 17 Soviet s e i zure of power 
from the Prov i s iona l Government after the Ru s s ian Revolu-
tion. The Soviet government und er Lenin denied the t errit orial 
( 3 1 )  
c laims of  the T s ar ' s  government , thereby turning away the 
1 9 1 5  gai n s. Aft er the Treaty of  Bre s t-Litovsk in March , 
19 1 8 , the S ov i e t  government under Lenin wa s removed from 
any maJor p ower treaty nego t i at i o n s  at the end of World 
War I. The reemergence of the T s ar i st ob j ect ive of  imperial 
expans i on wa s reawakened by Stalin for the S oviet Uni on. 
S ta l i n  made four uns uc c e s s fu l  att empt s  for the Soviet 
Union in trying to gain a footh o l d  in  the Mediterranean Sea 
and the Middle East . The f ir s t  failure dealt with the s e cret 
ne gotiat i on s  between Naz i  Germany and the Soviet Union i n  
19 4 0. I n  the shor t - l ived agreement with Germany , Stalin 
dec lar ed that Soviet int eres t s  l ay toward the Indian Oc ean 
and naval  fre edom through the Stra it s. The imp l ementat ion 
of Operat i on Barbaro s s a , the German invas ion of  the S oviet 
Union on June 2 2 , 1 9 41 , ended S t a l i n ' s  p lan.2 6  
Stalin ' s  s econd uns e c c e s sful attempt cent ered around 
the part it ion of P a l e s t ine and the oc cupat i on of Iran. Duri ng 
Wor ld War I I , Great Br itain made  an agreeme nt with the Sovi e t s  
by which they wou ld both mil it ar i ly oc cupy Iran. Thi s j o int 
occup at ion wou ld hop e fu l ly insure that G ermany cou ld not 
ga in the vital  oil re sour c e s  of Iran. Stalin  want ed both 
the o il re sourc e s  and a communist stat e  to be creat ed in the 
Midd l e  East. The S ov i e t  Un ion support ed two p o l it ical  part ie s , 
the Kur d i sh Peop l e s  Republic  and the Azerba i j an government 
led by Jofar P i shevari. The communist party of  Iran , the 
Tud eh , rece ived aid from the Soviet Union to maintain them­
s e lve s in the ir s trugg le for control. The Iranian government 
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secured a United Nation s r e s o lut ion calling for the remova l 
of Soviet troop s ;  aided by Unit ed S tates  pre s sure , Soviet 
troop s were removed , two Iran ian commun i s t  leaders were 
2 7 executed , and the Tudeh communist  party wa s out lawed. 
Stalin ' s  third de feat at gaining t erri tory and Soviet 
inf luence in the area c oncerned Turkey. Sta lin sought the 
creation of mi l itary bases  in Turkey , the s ucce s s ion o f  
citie s  a t  Kar s and Ardahan , a b a s e  in t h e  Dardane l le s , and 
the former It a l i an Mediterranean C olony of Libya. Stalin 
real i z ed that Great Br itain could no longer maintain i t s  
pa st r o l e  o f  blocking Ru s s o - S ov i et expans ion i n t o  the area. 
What Stalin did no t ant icipat e wa s the quick react i o n  of 
the United Stat e s  under Pre s ident Truman in  f i l l ing the 
power vacuum. Pre s ident Truman succes s fu l ly c ountered the 
large Soviet military pre s e nce  on the T urk i s h  border by 
send ing large quant it i t e s  o f  mi l itary and ec onomi c aid to  
Turkey. The s e cur ity and integr ity of  Turkey was thus 
. . d 2 8  maintaine . 
The fourth ar ea of fai lure by Sta lin conc erned Gree ce. 
Stalin had i nd irect a id s ent t o  Greece t o  aid the communi s t  
revo lt. Sov iet t erritory wa s a l l owed to  become a safe haven 
for the  communi s t  for c e s  in betwe en gueri l la actions. Pre s i -
dent Truman a l s o  sent aid t o  help the G reek government put 
the revolt down. Thi s  wa s the first succ e s s fu l  app licat i on 
of the Truman Doctrine. Gr eece  and Turkey wer e admitted into 
NAT O in 1 9 5 2  which further prot e ct e d  them from Soviet ag-
. 2 9  gre s s io n. 
Soviet po l icy for expand ing it s inf luence , unt i l  the 
19 5 5  arms deal with Egypt , was one o f  act ive aggre s s ion . 
Thi s mi l itant po l icy did  not cau s e  the Middle East to  accept 
the communi s t  ideo l ogy . In  addition  t o  this , the athe i s t i c  
ba s is o f  c ommuni st ideo logy d i d  not appea l t o  the pas s i on at e  
Arab -Mu s l im nationa l i sm whi ch had rap id ly deve loped . A new 
tact ic wou ld have to be us ed to achi eve the expan s ion i s t  
goa l s  of the S oviet Union . 
When N asser turned to the communi s t  b loc f or mi litary 
aid and weapon s ,  it  pr ovided the Soviet Union with a wind­
fal l . This  wa s a new deve lopment whi ch might give the Sov iet s 
another opportunity . N a s s er ' s  act i o n  cou ld l e ad t o  a c ircum­
vention of  the We stern containment p o l icy , the creat i on of 
a Soviet influ ence among Arab nat iona li s t s , and the :po s s ib l e  
reemergence o f  communi st part i e s  in  t h e  Middle East. 
Na s s er ' s  initial  mov e in opening Egypt and the Midd le  
East  to communi s t  and  ne utral inf luence wa s at  the  Bandung 
Conference in Apri l  of 1 9 5 5 .  During the conferenc e ,  Na s s er 
talked with India ' s  Prime Mini s t er , Jawahrl a l  Nehru , and 
Ch ine s e  Premier -For e i gn Min i st er Chou En-Lai . Nas s er re ­
ali z ed that , b e s i d e s  deve loping a new avenue for h i s  p lan s , 
he could p lay East and We st agains t each o ther to  in sure 
the best  pos s ib l e  re s u lt s . Chou En-Lai ' s  experience at 
secur ing arms from the Soviet s without maintain ing a puppet 
role influenced Nas s er to  look more s er i ou s ly at the overtone s 
C. 3 4 )  
made by the Soviet amba s s ador to Egypt , Dani e l  S emenovich 
Solod , in February of  1 9 5 5. 3 0  
After Dulles  re j e cted Nas ser ' s  attempt s  to buy Unit ed 
Stat e s  arms , Nas s er made  inquiries  to  Great Britain ex­
pect ing to s ecure an arms arrangement after the l i 5 4  agree ­
ment to  evacuat e the Bri t i sh Suez  base , but n o  such arms 
deal r e sulted. Thi s brought t o  l ight an imp ortant deve lop -
me nt. S ir Anthony Eden , the Br i t i sh Prime Mini ster , 
wa s pro -Arab nat iona l i sm and not pro - I srael. He had in ­
structed Anthony Nut t i ng , hi s Under - S e cretary of  S tate for 
Fore ign Affairs , to  s tay on in Ca iro , try to  get on good 
terms with Nas s er , and draw him out on the p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of 
futur e Ang l o -Egypt ian cooperation aft er he had concluded the 
3 1  19 5 4  agreement. 
Anthony Nut t i ng p o int s out in h i s  book , No  End o f  a 
Le ss on , that prior to  G e neral G lubb ' s  d i smi s sal  by Ki ng 
Hus s ein of J ordan on March 1 ,  1 9 5 6 , S ir Anthony Eden wa s 
pro-Arab and cons idered Nas s er a great improvement over 
dealing with King Farouk. Eden defended Egypt ' s  refusal o f  
al lowing I srael ship s through t h e  canal a t  the Ber lin 
Conferenc e i n  January o f  1 9 5 4. Eden s tated that under 
Article  Ten of the Constantinople Conven t ion , the act io n  
was defendabl e  o n  the ground s that i t  a s sured the de fen s e  
of Egypt agains t I srae l i  arms import s. In his f irst  Guild-
hall speech , he stated that I srae l ' s  border s mus t  be  de­
cided on , and that the  d i s p laced Palestinian Arabs mus t  be 
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he lp ed . He even men t i oned the u s e  of e c onomi c s anct ions 
again s t  I srae l by every Arab s t at e  a s  an avenue that cou ld 
have been u sed . 3 2  
N a s s er ' s c ommun i s t  arms d e a l  in crea sed Ede n ' s d e s ire 
to bu i ld a strong er re lat i on ship with E gypt . He stated that 
" on no  ac count mu st we let the Ru s s ians int o the N i le 
3 3  Valley . "  T h i s  statement summed up why he s tr ong ly d e -
fend ed , i n  a d i s c u s s ion after the arms dea l , the j oint 
fund ing of the Aswan H igh Dam .  Ther e f ore , h e  wi l lin g ly 
p ledg ed Great Br itain t o  c ontr ibu t e  with the U n ited Stat e s  
for t h e  fund ing o f  Nas ser ' s  Aswan High Dam . 
Chapt er Three ( 3 6 ) 
D i srup t ion of the E a s t -We st Ba lance of P ower 
After the Aswan arms d e a l , Du l l e s  grew far more susp i ­
c iou s , d i stru stfu l , and angry at Nas ser . H e  saw the Bandung 
C onference of neutral nat ion s and the r e su lt ing arms deal as 
a p laying off of E a st and We s t . He v iewed Na s s er a s  trying 
to b lackma i l  the United S tate s int o an ec onomic race with 
the Soviet Un i on . Such competition coula re sult i n  Nas ser 
gaining better t erms on aid and arms agreement s  i n  the future 
un l e s s  the  S oviet s  wer e shown t o  be bluff ing . Du l le s  be ­
l ieved that the S oviet Union c ou ld not make trade and aid 
agreement s on any bet ter t erms than tho s e  extended by Am­
erica . Thi s v i ew , c oup led with h i s  anger at Nas ser ' s  action s , 
inf luenced D u l le s ' lat er dec i s ion t o  withdraw the United 
State s '  c ommitment on the Aswan Dam . 1 
In U . S .  and S ov i e t  P o l ic y  in the Middle E a st 1 9 4 5 - 5 6 , 
edited by J ohn D onovan , the aid and e c on omic track record of 
Egypt fr om 1 9 5 1  t o  mid -1 9 5 6  i s  reviewed . On January 1 7 , 
1 9 5 1 ,  Egypt bought f ifty thou sand tons  of wheat from the 
Soviet Union . I n  1 9 5 2 , Egypt bought f ifty thou s and t on s  of  
Amer ican wheat . F o l lowing th is  purcha se , the Egypt ians 
obtained two hundred thou s and tons of  S ov i e t  wheat f or twe nty­
one tho u s and t on s  of  cotton . Then , in February of  1 9 5 2 ,  
Egyp t  agreed t o  c ooperate with the Unit ed Stat e s  for more 
aid . In  Apri l of  1 9 5 5 ,  Egypt trad ed c ot t on and c ot t on yarn 
for nine mi l l i on d o l lar s of Rumanian crude  o i l  and ker o ­
sene . At the Bandung Conferenc e , Nas ser init iated trade 
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agre ements with Commu.ni s t  C hina , Thi s  re sulted i n  a t ot a l  
of twe nty-n ine m i l l ion d o l lar s in cotton f or Chin e s e  oil , 
iron , and machinery . Na s s er then announced that the S ov i e t s  
wer e neg otiat ing Soviet reac t or a i d  and training o f  Egypt ian 
scient i s t s  with the Egyp t ian gov ernme nt . By 1 9 5 6 , it wa s 
e s t imat e d  that one hundred and s ixty m i l l ion do l lar s in 
Soviet aid had been g iven to  Nas s er ' s  Egypt . The s e  fact or s 
c lear ly affected E ast -We s t  attempt s to  bec ome the dominating 
. f . 2 in luence in Egypt . 
Nas ser p l ayed a she l l  game wi th the A swan D am .  He 
pas sed i t s f inanc ing fr om one s id e  to the other . Th i s  
teeter - t otter proc e s s  p itted E a s t  and We s t  against each 
other , and the o n ly apparent v ictor f or Na s s er wou ld be 
Egypt . He felt that he c ou ld secure the least amount of 
intere s t  rate s ,  the mos t  amount of  cap ital backing , the 
ne c e s sary e qu ipment and t e chnic ians , and thu s ke ep the 
eventua l leader s '  inf luence down to a neg l i g ib le amount . 
I n  order t o  p lacate the strained s i tuat ion which existed 
be tween h i s  government and the S ov i e t  Union , Na s s er gradual ly 
rever s e d  hi s ant i - S ov i e t  and communi st p o l i c ie s . He t oned 
down the anti -communi s t  attacks of  V o ice  of Cairo radio 
broadca s t s . The Soviet Union qu ickly r e a l i z e d  this and re-
ciprocated by  l e s s e ni ng it s crit ic ism s  of his  nationa l i st ic 
gov ernment . Egypt then s igne d ec onomic trade agre ement s 
with the Sovie t s . Ru s s ia then s e nt S o lod , Soviet Amba s s ador 
to  Egyp t , to seriou s ly c our t Nas ser . Common hatr ed of  the 
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Baghdad Pact was d e c l ared by both nat ion s . Recognit ion of 
C ommunist  China wa s be i ng negot iated , Egypt and Rus s ia a l s o  
agreed to a n  arms d e a l  which further s trengthened re lat i on s . 
To top thi s  off , the Soviet  U n i on l e t  it be known t o  Nas ser 
and the wor ld that it wa s wi l l i ng to  fund or part ic ipate i n  
the funding of the Aswan Dam proj ect . 3 
Secretary Du l l e s  wa s an a s tute state sman who had pre -
viou s l y  negot iated the Japane s e  Peace Treaty for the United 
Stat e s  after Wor ld War I I .  O n  h i s  d e sk in the State  D epar t -
ment , he kept a c opy of S t a l in ' s Pr oblem s  of Lenini sm be s id e  
h i s  family Bible , s ome c op i e s  o f  the F edera l i st Paper s ,  and 
the Charter of the United Nat ion s . He u s ed h i s  Bible f or 
pas s ag e s  which he cou ld i nt egrate into h i s  speeche s . Th i s  
wou ld show the strength and soundne s s  of  Ameri can actions . 
The F ed era l i st Paper s were for f ore ign d ign itar i e s  s o  they 
c ou ld learn the pr inc ip l e s  that Amer ica s t o od f or . The 
Charter of the United Nat i on s  wa s there so that he could 
read i ly adap t Unit ed States  f ore ign pol icy to  upho ld and 
expound the pol i c i e s  and pr inc ip l e s  of the United Nat ion s 
4 for wor ld order and peace . 
Sta lin ' s  Problems of  Le n in i sm wa s there f or the purpo se  
of  knowing one ' s  enemy . He real i z ed that the  S ov i et Union ' s  
peaceful cooperation and i t s  Sta lini s t i c  v i ews were not 
geared for advancement of the equa lity of  a ll nat ions  and 
men a s  e qual but f or the advancement of S ov i e t  i nf luence 
and subs equent dominat i on of nat ions weak enough to fall to 
S oviet p lans . 
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For Du lle s ,  the Soviet Union and i t s  c ommuni s t  ideo logy 
repre s ent ed a maj or threat to wor ld p e ace , His p o l icy of  
containment and ma s s ive  retaliat ion was  s id e s t epped by  the  
Sov iet arms d e a l  t o  Egypt . He considered thi s advancement 
a s  a harb inger of p o s s ible  future move s .  Therefore , the 
Soviet Union mu st be c ountered . He f e lt that the Unit ed 
Stat e s  mu s t  make the Middle E a s t  s ecure from the Soviet 
inf luenc e .  The best p o s s ible  way wa s to  show that the 
Soviet Union cou ld not ma intain i t s  promi s e s  nor did it 
have friendly intent ions at heart . 
Brit i sh F or e ign Mini s ter Anthony Eden made it  c le ar what 
his  view of Dulle s was prior t o  Dulle s bec oming the Secretary 
of Stat e . Ear ly in 1 9 5 2 ,  E d e n  had per s on ally v i s ited E i s e n ­
hower while he was at NAT O headquarters s tat ing why he d id 
not want Du l le s to  be appo inted S ecretary of S t ate  if  E i s e n ­
hower won the Pre s id e nt i al e lect i on in the f a l l . Eden 
stat e d  t hat he  d id not think t hat he  wou ld be  ab le to  work 
with Du lle s . Thi s wa s due t o  hi s v iew of Dulle s '  track 
record up to 1 9 5 2 . I n  1 9 5 1 , dur ing the Jap ane se  P e ace  Tre aty 
t alks , the Br it ish F ore ign Office  wa s repre sented by Herbert 
Morr i son . Dur ing the se t a lk s , the i s sue of r e c og n i t i on ot 
the leg i t imat e g ov ernment of ma in land China came up . Br itain 
f avored Mao ' s c ommuni s t  government and wa nted no  pre s sure 
to be p laced on Japan as to which g overnment , the Nat iona l i s t  
government o f  Chaing Kai -shek or Mao ' s ,  Japan wou ld support . 
At the t ime , Du l le s  clear ly agre ed with the Br i t i s h . When 
Du lle s returned to Amer ica , he cri t i c i zed the Brit i s h  f or 
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recogniz ing the c ommu n i s t  governme nt and urged Japan t o  
recognize Chaing Ka i - shek . Morr i s on wa s d i scred ited by 
Du l le s ' actions and the Br iti sh Fore ign Office wa s mo s t  up s e t  
with Du l le s ' apparent change o f  mind . Eden , fr om the very 
start , did not tru st Du l le s  n or did he p i n  D u l l e s  d own on a 
1 t f Am . ' . . 5 c ear cu s tatement o er ica s intenti on s . 
Dul le s  did not appr ove of E d e n ' s  p o l it i c a l  v iews . He 
con sidered Eden t o  re semb le far t oo much the image of f ormer 
Secretary of S tat e D e an Ache s on . Du l le s  had no love for e ither , 
and the r e s emblance d id not he lp matt er s . Dulle s d i sapproved 
of Br i tain ' s  h i s t or y  of be ing the d ominant wor ld p ower prior 
to  Wor ld War I .  H e  a ls o  d i s liked co l onia l i sm and imperia l i sm 
on which the Br i t i s h  Emp ire wa s bu i lt , and the way that the 
Br i t i sh had treated Pre s ident Wi l s on wa s unforg ivable to him . 
An ar i st ocrat ic Eden be came a r iv a l  in  i nternational d ip lo -
mac y .  Du l l e s  cou ld n ot share c enter stage  with anyone . 
Both were exc e p t i onal wor ld p o liticians  who s e  succe s se s  w i l l  
always stand i n  h igh regard , but b o t h  being strong wi l led , 
the y cou ld not keep per s ona l fee l ing s out of their j o int 
act iv it ie s . Thi s mutua l  di s tru s t  and compe t i t ive d i sp o -
s i t ion hurt the ability o f  the We s t  t o  cooperate when the 
Sue z  Cana l wa s nat i onal i zed  which led dire ct ly to expan s ion 
6 of S ov iet inf luence in  the Middle E a s t . 
Premier Na s s er , on March 1 ,  1 9 5 6 , rep laced Du l le s  a s  
Eden ' s most d i s tru sted and d i s l i ked indiv idua l . On Mar ch 
1 ,  1 9 5 6 ,  G eneral G lubb and h i s  s en ior Br i t i sh o f f icer s , 
who were the t op off icers  of  J ordan ' s army , were f ired by 
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King Hu s se in . 7 Ede n , on hear �ng thi s , did  a comp lete  about ­
face in hi s v iew of Na s s er , He he ld Nas ser as the c au s e  of 
this  new se tback to the image of Great Br i tain in the 
Midd le Ea st. Eden considered Nas ser ' s  gu i lt t o  be  s e l f ­
evident based on h i s  inf lammatory r ad i o  me s sag e s  against  
Britain and it s inf luence t o  Jordan which G lubb ' s  di smi s s a l  
repre sented . Anthony Nutt ing , Br i t i sh Under - S ecret ary of 
Stat e f or F ore ign Affair s , s t ated that an enraged Eden 
stated , " You love Na s s er , but I s ay that he  is  our e nemy , 
8 
and he sha l l  be treated as such , "  and " I  want him de s troyed . "  
G e neral G lubb , when he arr ived in Eng land , informed Nutting 
that Hu s se in removed him due to  the k i ng ' s  need t o  con s o l id ate 
his contr o l  in J ordan , and that N a s ser had nothing t o  do 
with it . Even after G lubb informed E d e n , he s t i l l  he ld 
Nas s er a s  the t op e nemy of  Britain in  the Middle E a s t , 
and he mu st be de str oye d. When a sked if it wou ld be bet ter 
to maintain him in  a more c ontr o l led p o s i t ion in  order t o  
ma intain ord er in  Egypt , E d e n  rep l ied , " But I don ' t want 
an a lternat ive , and I d on ' t g ive  a damn if  there ' s  anarchy 
and chaos in Egypt ! "  Nutt ing c ontended that fr om thi s point 
on , Eden and the conservat ive imperial PM ' s  wou ld not al low 
reason to d ictate Br itain ' s  p o l icy , but the f e e l ing s of 
reveng e  wou ld contro l t he po l i cy taken by Britain toward 
Nas ser and Egypt. 
Prior t o  the d i smi s s a l  of G lubb and the chang e o f  
Eden ' s  view toward Na s s er , the Pr ime Mini s ter made  a per sonal 
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vi s i t  to the White  Hou s e , The purp ose of thi s v i s it wa s t o  
c l e ar ly def ine a united p o s it i on toward s the Midd l e  E a s t  
and the A swan pr oj e c t. E d en returned t o  Br itain p leased  
that both c ountr ie s  were united  on a l l  t op ics. Pre s ident 
E i s e nhower agreed that Bri t i sh and Amer ican aid should j oi nt ly 
fund the pr o j ect , the pro j e c t  shou ld go f orward , and if 
Na s ser proved to  be coop erative , Egypt should be he lped b y  
the two power s i n  the future.9 
What then cau s e d  this j o int agre ement to  fund the Aswan 
pro j e c t  t o  be cance l led ? Eden ' s  change of heart , in re ference 
t o  Na s ser derived from G lubb ' s  d i smi s sa l  and Nas s er ' s V o ice 
broadca s t s. However , Great Britain wa s s t i l l  c ommitted to 
fund the pr oj ect unle s s  the United S t at e s  refu s e d  it s 
commitment. Americ a ' s  canc e l lat i on of it s commitment t o  fund 
the irr igati on pro j ect s t emmed fr om a p e r s ona l and emotional 
d e c i s ion on the part of S e cretary of S tat e Du l l e s. This 
cance l lat i on by Du lle s wa s not ba sed on the rat iona l argu ­
ment s against the Uni t ed S tat e s ' par t i c ipat ion , wh ich were 
not s trong enough , nor wa s it r e f le c t iv e  of America ' s  nat i on a l  
intere s t s. 
The ma in thrust of oppo s it i on t o  Amer ica ' s  p art ic ipat ion 
re sted i n  the United S tat e s  S e nate . The S e nat e Appropr i ­
ation s Committee and Demo crat ic Senator Wal ter F. G eorge 
were the leading obj ector s. The Appropriations Committee 
made a public pre s s  release s tating that it had a sked S e cretary 
of State Dul le s not to spend any Mut ual  Secur ity F und s on 
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the Aswan pr o j ect without the ir c on sent . This  po s it ion was 
taken due t o  growing t e n s io n s  be tween I srae l and Egypt which 
could make the e c onomic s ituat ion cr i t i ca l , and E gypt ' s  
gr owing re lat ion s with the S ov i e t  U n i on added t o  the ir s t i ­
pu lation . Senator G e orge argu ed again s t  the u s e  o f  Ameri can 
fund s in bu i ld ing the dam due to the amount of potential 
c ot ton pr oducing land which wou ld then be c u lt iv at e d . He 
argued that this  wou ld c ut into c otton s ale s of America on 
the wor ld market ,  and that it wou ld not have any inf luence 
in maintaining p e ac e  betwe e n  I srae l and E gypt . The s e  argu­
ments agains t u s ing United Stat e s  cap i t a l  in the A swan 
proj ect  were ba sed on the s ituat ion in the area , the source 
of the fund s , and the per sonal s e l f - inter e s t s  of  southern 
c otton gr ower s which S e nat or G e orge repre sented . The 
Appropriat ion s C ommitte e ' s  argument and st ipulation c ould 
have been e as i ly ignored or rat io n a l ly turned i n  f avor of 
the proj e ct ' s  fund ing . D u l l e s  had , in 1 9 5 5 , forma lly an­
nounced that money for the ini t i a l  s tart of the proj ect  wou ld 
be a l l ocat ed from the " f lex ib le Pre s idential fund for u s e  
in the Near and � idd le East 11 •
1 0 Thi s  wou ld be from a one 
hundred mi l l ion d o l lar s 1 9 5 7  f i s c a l  ye ar Pre s idential fund . 
The e s t imated year ly c ontr ibut i on of United S tate s funds 
wa s p laced at f i ft e en to  twenty mi l l ion d o l l ar s . The 
permi s s i on of the Appropr iat ion s C ommittee was not nece s s ary . 
The C ommittee c ou ld have  been per s uaded u s ing the ir own 
argument . The dam wou ld increa se  Egypt ' s  ability to  have a 
stronger wor ld cred i t . Therefore Egypt , inf luenced by 
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American partic ipat ion , c ou ld purcha se  Amer ican product s and 
thu s help America ' s  economy . The increase in Egypt ' s  s tandard 
of living and emp loyment wou ld improve the p o lit ica l  c l imat e 
in Egyp t . America ' s  funding of the darn wou ld ease  p olit ical 
influence out of the irr igat ion pr o j ect and prevent them fr om 
rec e i v i ng wor ld ac clairn . 1 1  
Senator George ' s  argument that cotton product ion r e su l t -
ing fr om the darn wou ld cut into the United S tate s '  wor ld 
market wa s a ha sty general i z at ion . F ir st , the darn would not 
be comp leted f or an e s t imated f i ft e e n  year s , nor wou ld the 
land be immediate ly product ive . It  wou ld be rough ly twenty 
year s before the effect of the dam ' s irr igat ion would have 
an impact on the wor ld marke t .  S e cond ly , the p opulation 
growth rate of the wor ld wou ld generate an increase in  the 
demand and subsequent use of cotton and other tex t i le s . The 
advent and impr ovement of  ex i s t i ng synthet i c  c loths wou ld 
natura lly d ecrease cotton u s e . S enator G e orge a l s o repre sented 
a se lf- intere st gr oup , s outhern � cotton - farrner s , who wou ld 
" f . h • I b • f 1 . 1 2  sacr i  i c e  t e nat ion s e s t  intere s t  or p er s ona g ai n . 
I t  was dip lomat i c a l ly nece s sary for the Unit ed  States  
to take an act ive ro le in  the newly d eve loping , expanding , 
and po l i t i c a l ly cons ciou s Middle East . S enat or G e orge con -
trad icted h imse lf by s t at ing that he wou ld not p lace a st ipu-
lat ion on the loan prevent ing the u s e  o f  water f or the en-
couragernent of commerci a l  cotton product ion . Thi s was con-
tradictory , s ince Senat or George wa s against  g i v ing the aid 
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becau s e  it wou ld und ercut the c ot t on market of  the Amer ican 
cotton gr ower s .  I t  wa s wor se to deny aid than t o  re strict 
i t s  u s e , for it meant the future growth o f  Egypt and it s 
13 peop le . 
S ince argument s of i the oppos it ion were not threaten ing 
to the grant ing o f  United S tate s aid , then what cau s e d  D u l l e s  
to  canc e l  Amer ica ' s  commitment t o  fund t h e  A swan proj ect ?  
Nas ser ' s neutral game and the S oviet unr e l iab i l ity of it s 
e conomic stabi lity to provide the nece s sary fund s inf luenc e d  
D u l le s ' d e c i s ion . D u l l e s  wa s rap i d ly becoming up s e t  with 
Na s ser ' s  act ion s .  I t  was one thing f or Nas s er t o  be antago ­
nis t ic to France or Great Br itain , but it was a bre ach of  
the  e leventh commandment of Du l l e s  which was r e s p e c t  and 
accept Amer ica as the b e s t  gu iding inf luence . N a s s er cr it i ­
c i zed the United S tate s once t oo o fte n . Mor e over , h e  fai led 
t o  f o l low suit on  h i s  own prior agre ement s .  Nas ser accept e d  
mi l li on s  i n  a i d  int end ing t o  accept the Baghdad Pact , but 
instead took the a i d  and rej ected and aggres s iv e ly attacked 
the Pact . Na s s er c au s ed Dul le s  to  separate from America ' s  
Western a l ly ,  Gr eat Britain , and not s i gn the Pact , thereby 
d i s credit ing him s e lf in the eye s of t he Bri t i sh Pr ime Mini s ter . 
Premi er Nas ser accepted Amer i can offer s of aid wh i l e  s t imu -
lat ing Soviet prop os a l s . By a s s ociat ing with the neutra l 
camp , Na s s er increased the ab i l it y  o f  t he Soviet Union t o  
block Amer ican prop o s a l s  in t h e  Unit e d  Nation s . Na s s er 
breache d  D u l l e s ' containment wa l l  around the S ov iet  Union and 
commu n i s t  bloc by accept ing the C z echo s l ovak ian arms dea l . 
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Thi s  d i scredited the image of  Amer i c a  with the Arab nat ional­
i s t s  which Du l le s  had been trying to cu ltivate . Finally , 
Nas s er had recogn i zed  Peking ' s  government , further hinde r ­
ing Amer ican e f f ort s a t  neutra l i z in g  t h e  c ommun i s t  i n f  l u -
1 4  ence . 
Dul le s  wanted to  t ake Nas ser d own from hi s c lever ly 
achieved p o s i t i on as king of the Arab n at ion a l i s t  mountain , 
to  pub l i c ly rebut him , and to  d i s credit  h im in  the eyes 
of the Arab ma s se s .  I f  the infa l li b le and a l l-de l ivering 
Na s s er wa s shown t o  be incapable of produ c i ng the obj ect 
of h i s  great e s t  pr omi s e s , the Arab wor ld wou ld real i z e  that 
Nas ser was a weak and windy le ader . Du l l e s  want ed t o  teach 
Na s ser , who d ouble cro s sed  him and r ocke d his carefully 
pi loted boat , a le s son  that the neutral leaders  of  the 
wor ld could not f orget . Nas s er was to be shocked back int o 
line . 
Dulles  a l s o  wanted to d i scredit the Soviet Union once 
and f or all in the Middle East . He p lanned t o  do  thi s  by 
showing that e c onomic promi s e s  of the Soviet Union were 
made  on a weak and unsound e conomy . He bel ieved that Sovie t 
ec onomy wa s nearing a c o l lap se  due t o  it s rapid mi litary 
bu i ldup and re s tricted s tructure . The e s t imat e d  one and 
three -tenths bill ion do l lar dam pro j ect  wou ld stret ch the 
ruble to the breaking p o int , caus ing a Soviet aid col lap s e . 
Thi s  c o l lapse  wou ld affe ct  a l l  c ommuni s t  and neutral c ountr i e s  
u s i ng S oviet cap i tal . The growi ng t en s i on i n  t h e  S ov i et 
sate l lite  c ountr i e s  in Europe wa s proof that the s ituat i o n  
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wa s ne ar ing a critical stage. When the S ov iet Union could 
no l ong er keep i t s  promi s e s , America and the free e conomie s  
o f  the We st wou l d  appear a s  the only sound banker with whi ch 
to do bu s ine s s. For had not the Mar sha l l  P lan shown what 
cou ld be achi eved u s ing United S tate s capita l whi le the 
Mo l ot ov P lan c ould only provide token fund s . The shining 
examp le of indu s trial We s t ern Europe proved onc e and for 
11 Am . b . l "  . 1 5  a erican capa i it i e s. 
What D u l l e s  fai led t o  rea li z e , given the e conomic s itu-
at ion which exi s t e d  in the Soviet Union , wa s it s ab i lity to  
improve its  ec onomy , thereby genera t i ng the ne c e s sary revenue . 
Du l le s  shou ld have remembered the ec onomi c system o f  the 
Sov i et Union in 1 9 5 3  under the S e cret P o l ice  Chi e f  Ber i a. 
It  may s eem a bit odd to  a s s o c iate the two but not s o  odd 
after revi ewing the magn itude o f  Ber i a ' s  impact. One -third 
of all labor wa s done by pr i so ner s under Beria ' s  order s. 
Th i s  type  of i ndu s tr ial s lave labor ma i ntained a control led 
supp l y  of cheap labor t o  help improve the economy by main-
taining low wage s . Such forced labor a l lowed a greater 
freedom of contr o l  over Soviet  economic p o l i cy , thereby 
generat ing the nece s sary funds f or prov i d i ng fore i gn aid. 
The sy s t em d i ctated d ir e ct contro l over the amount of cap i t a l  
f or government u s e. T h e  Pre s id ent of  t h e  U n i t e d  Stat e s  had 
C ongre s s , the pres s ,  and the voting pub l ic to wre s t l e  the 
budget pa s t. In  the Soviet Union no such fre e  pre s s  nor 
(4 8 )  
ba lanced d i s tribut ion of  leg i s lati on and no repre s entat ion 
of popular opinion existed  to hinder the generation of 
the one and three -tenths b i l l ion dol lar s i n  e s t imated develop­
ment fund s . Th i s  meant that the  Soviet Union wa s j u st a s  
capable o f  f i nancing the dam a s  t h e  United S t at e s , the 
Wor ld Bank , and Great Br itain c ould i n  the ir j o int proj ect . 1 6  
Dulle s , on July 1 9 , 1 9 5 6 , refu s e d  to g ive  E gypt the 
nece s sary l oan for the funding of  the dam . 1 7  Thi s wa s a 
refu sal of the agreement between Pre s i dent E i s enhower and 
Pr ime M i n i s t er Eden to cont inue with the l oan t o  keep out 
any further advanc e s  of Soviet influenc e . Two unmentioned 
career State  Department off ic i a l s  wer e pre s ent whe n  Dul l e s  
i nformed Egyp t i an Amba s sador Hu s s e in and retold i t  t o  Herman 
F iner , author of Dul l e s  Over Sue z . Hu s s e in wa s sent to the 
United S tate s by Na s s er on July 1 7  . t o s e cure the loan in a 
forma l agreement . Thi s move was mad e after part s of  the 
Soviet terms were pub l i c ly r e le a s e d  which Nas s e r  hop ed wou ld 
generate better t erms by the United S tate s .  D u l l e s  wa s 
to  have started out i n  a s low ,  d e liberat e , informat ive style 
re i t erat ing the Senate Appropr iat ions  Committee  and the 
cotton intere s t s  argument s aga inst the l oan . Hu s s e i n  be came 
agitated and worried . He interj ected , " D on ' t  p l e a s e  say 
you are g oing to  withdraw the o f f er , becau s e  ( p o int i ng t o  
pocket ) we have the Ru s s ian offer t o  f i nance t h e  dam r i ght 
here in my p ocket . "  Hus s e in was bluffing , for the Sovie t s  
had made no guarant eed offer . Du lle s wa s s a id t o  have 
( 4 9 )  
immed i at e ly repl ied , " We l l , a s  you have the money a lr eady , 
you don ' t  need any from u s ! My offer i s  withdrawn . " 1 8  
After this s tatement , the me et ing ended . 
The French Amba s sador , Couve de Murv i l l e , pr ior t o  the 
July 1 9  meeting of Dul l e s  and Hu s s e in , had warned that if 
the j o int financing p lan for the dam was refus ed , Nas s er 
wou ld probab ly s e i z e  the cana l . An ominous warning wa s not 
heeded . The Br it i sh Ambas sador , S ir Roger Mak ins , had pri or 
to the July 1 9  meet i ng , urged Du l l e s  to seriou s l y  review a l l  
pos s ible cho i c e s  before reaching a d e c i s ion for t h e  Brit i s h  
and Wor ld Bank l oans r e s t e d  on the United S tate s ' partic ipa-
t ion . S in c e  the United S tat e s  had lit t le to lose  in E gypt , 
Britain ' s  inf luenc e and p o s s e s s io n s  wou ld be  at stake not t o  
ment ion the succe s s  or fai lure o f  Soviet advancement into the 
ar ea . 
Dulles  had re j ected the loan f or the very s ame f e ar s  
ment ioned by Hu s s e i n , the Ru s s ian s tatement s .  I n  do ing so , 
Dul l e s  had contrad icted hi s ear l i er pre s s  s tatement s .  It  
is  true that he wa s gradua l ly re s tructur ing h i s  pre s s  state ­
ment s to gain the mo st advantage s over the Soviet propaganda 
in the wor ld pre s s . He had s t at e d  that the loan proj ect and 
Aswan p lans were not due to any Soviet actions . It  wa s 
s o le ly a We s t ern -Egypt ian operat ion . The Soviet s count ere d ,  
s ay ing they wou ld l ike to  part ic ipat e unle s s  the t erms o f  
the We s t -Egyp t  p lan direct ly prevented Soviet part i c ipat ion . 
Dul le s  countere d  saying that any out s i de a s s i s tance wou ld be 
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gladly acceptable if  it was s o le ly for enhqnc ing the s ituat i on 
in Egypt . He said  that the S ov i et Union could part i c ipat e 
if it truly wa s not a " Tro j an hor s e "  t o  further Soviet 
influence and dominat ion over the lives  of free independent 
nat ions . The Soviet reaction wa s a pub l i c  stat ement i n  
Egypt saying the S ov iet  Union could be counted o n  in true 
supp ort for i t s  Arab friend s and incre a s ed i t s  aid propo sal . 
Dul le s  wa s not calmly bru shing a s ide  the Soviet stat ement s 
and propaganda , but became extreme ly agit ated by them . 
He th er efore rej ected the We s t ern aid package in one quick 
statement to pub lic ly push t he Sov iet Uni on into a suppo s ed ly 
b l  . . . 1 9  unt ena e economic p o s i t i on . 
Na s ser , who had be come Pre s ident in  the 1 9 5 5  elect ions , 
wa s negot iat ing with Sovi e t  amba s s ador s . The rej e ct ion of  
the aid package hit hard in  E gypt . P opu lar f e e lings were 
extreme ly enraged again s t  the We st . Nas s er ' s  cre dibil ity 
wa s at stake , and h i s  leadership role in  Ar ab nationa l ism 
wa s threatened . He had to  react in a way which overshadowed 
the blow dealt by Du l l e s  to his p o s i t ion and reas sert his  
role a s  the guid ing force of  Arab nat ion a l i sm . The mai n  
propaganda p loy of  hi s ro le a s  leader of the Egypt revo lut i on , 
the Aswan Dam , wa s for the moment dashed apart on the 
rocks of his neutra l i s t , double deal ing p o l i cy . I f  the 
Egypt ian and Arab ma s s e s  saw that he had been outf lanke d 
and left impotent to achieve their goal s ,  he wou ld  be merely 
an i n signifi cant name in h i s t ory . A maj or maneuver mu st be 
2 0  made . 
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The S oviet Union was caught i n  an awkward p o s i t i on whi ch 
Dul le s had ach i eved . However , the ir p o s ition wa s not as 
ec onomic a l ly s trained as Dul l e s  pre d i ct ed . They denied 
the s um of the Soviet aid grant as report e d  in  We s tern 
pre s s e s , but d id state that if a sked , the Soviet Union 
wou ld g la d ly accept any Egypt ian reque s t s  and t erms for 
deve lopment . By s tat ing deve l opment loan s , they were s tre s s -
ing industrial contr o l  over the Aswan pro j e c t . Thi s wa s in 
the hope of  enc ouraging a more unit e d  pro le tariat c la s s  i n  
Egypt but the Soviet s wou ld channe l it  t o  the dam pro j ect 
if  so reques t e d . Thi s a l s o  me ant that Na s s er had not made any 
seriou s  inquiri e s  or tran s actions  for Soviet loans for the 
. 2 1  proJ ect . 
Pre s ident Nas s er was indirectly shown by the Soviet 
statement to be  playing on the We s t ' s  ant i c ommuni s t  s ym-
pathies  in order to acquire more funds  on better terms . 
He immed iat e ly denied that any serious t a lk s  on  the Aswan 
aid had ever oc curred . Nass er hoped thi s  wou ld return the 
We s tern prop o s a l . Nas s er wa s not a genius , but ne ither was 
he a foo l . He real i ze d  that he had t o  act and act f a s t . 
He had no inte n t io n s  of  becoming c lo s e l y  l inked with the 
Soviet Union , but his  E a st versus  West d i p l omacy left  h im 
litt le  choice . On July 2 7 , 1 9 5 6 , in A lexandr ia , Egypt , 
a dua l bombshe l l  for the We s t  wa s dropp ed by Nas s er . The 
first one wa s qu i e t ly d e l ivered at the Unit e d  S tate s ,  and 
. B . . 2 2  the s e c ond one hit l oudly at Franc e and Great rit ain . 
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The f ir s t  one was a change in N a s s er ' s  p o l i c i e s  towards  
the Soviet  Union . G ama l Salem , Salah S a lem , and Kha lid  
Mohiedd in began t o  appear on the pod ium during Nas s er ' s  
sp eeche s . The import anc e of  the s e  thre e  ind ividua l s  wa s 
the ir past  s tand ing s and stat ed po litical b e l i e f s . In  the 
pa st they had been politically p er sona non grat a ,  and one 
was in  exi le av oiding trial . N ow they were a l l  shar ing the 
pub lic  s pot l ight wi th Na s s er . What had made them so  d i sfa­
vored in  the pa s t ?  It  was becau s e  the two S alem broth er s and 
Mohieddin were  top Egypt i an commun i s t s and the communist  party 
had long been suppre s s e d  in Egypt . They and the ir b e l i e f s  
were now ho ld ing high p o s itions in  pub lic  offi ce  a t  N a s s er ' s  
permi s s ion . This  showed the wor ld that commun i sm , at least  
in  the  top rank s in Egypt , was  now being g iven p o s it ions o f  
high favor . T h e  S ov i e t  Union wa s given a great gift , for it  
showe d Arab nati ona l i s t s  that Na s s er now tru s t e d  communist 
advic e .  The Sov i et Union now had an inf luence ins ide Egypt ian 
pol it ic s . Du l le s ' c onta inment wa s now breached p o l i t ically 
and soc i a l ly i n  addition to it s mil itary and aid breach in the 
1 9 5 5  arms dea l . 2 3  
The s e cond bomb she l l  which hit hard and loud wa s the 
announcement by Na s s er that the Sue z Canal , its equ ipment , 
per s onne l ,  and c ompany wo u ld be nat iona l i z ed int o a com­
plet e ly E gyp t ian p o s s e s s ion . He denounced the We st ' s  s up ­
p o s ed attemp t a t  dic tat ing t erms i n  the l oan which wou ld 
have virtual ly r e s t ored We s t ern dominat ion of Egypt ' s  
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The s econd bomb she l l  which hit hard and loud wa s the 
announc ement by Na s s er that the Sue z Canal , its equ ipment , 
per s onne l ,  and c ompany wou ld be nat iona l i z ed int o a c om­
plet e ly Egypt ian po s s e s s i on . He d e nounced the We s t ' s  s up ­
p o s ed attemp t a t  dic tat ing t erms i n  t h e  l oan which wou ld 
have v irtual ly r e s t ored We s t ern dominat ion of Egypt ' s  
economy . He d enounced the co lon i a l  past of  France and 
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Br itain , stat ing they had robbed Egypt of it s cana l , it s 
control , and the annual revenu e s  of over one hundred mi l lion 
d ol lar s from the pe op le of Egypt . He wou ld r e s t ore Egyp t i an 
owner ship and manag ement . The revenue generat ed from the 
canal wou ld be u s ed t o  f inance Egypt ' s  Aswan H igh Dam , 
giving Egypt freed om from economic dependency on We s tern 
loan s . This wa s f or the people of E gypt . Thi s move im-
med iate ly re s t ored t he c on f idence of the E gypt ian p e op l e  in 
Nas ser . Nas ser , in one smooth swoop , had a chi eved unpr e c e -
dented p opularity with the Arab nat i onal i s t s  and had t o s sed 
Dulle s ' rebuke int o the f ac e s  of  the French and Br it i sh gov-
ernmen t s . The p o l it ica l shot by D u l le s had r i cocheted and hit 
h . 1 1 ' 2 4  i s  a i e s . 
On N ovember 2 5 , 1 8 7 5 , Gr eat Britain had pur cha sed one 
hundr ed seventy- s ix thou sand , s ix hundred and two share s of 
the Suez Cana l Comp any in a v ery int er e s t ing f in an c ial  ar -
rang eme nt f or f our mi l l i on p ound s s ter l ing fr om the Khed ive 
of Egypt . This mad e the g overnment of Great Brit ain and the 
pr ivat e sector of  France the pr inc ipal owner s of the Suez 
C an a l  Company . The Br it i sh g overnment , as  of  1 9 5 6 , owned 
f orty-four percent of the canal stock and seventy-e ight 
percent of the remain ing f ifty- s ix per cent wa s owned by the 
pr ivate sec tor in Franc e . B e s id e s  the cana l be ing a deoendabl e 
avenue of Eur ope ' s  oi l supp ly , it a l s o  generat ed a t idy profit 
f or their ec onomie s .  Nas ser ' s  actions not only r e s t ored his 
p o s i t ion mor e secur e ly , he also increased the f e ar s  of Great 
( 5 4 )  
Br it ain and France regard ing t he ir d e c l ining wor ld p o s i -
t ion , their p ocketbooks , and the safety o f  the ir oi l sup -
1 .  2 5  i e s . 
The Br it i s h  immed iat e ly r eacted . After the initial  
prot e st s ,  the  government launched a two -edged r e sp on se . 
Fir st , a l l  E gypt ian a s se t s  and can a l  company a s se t s  were 
fro z en . This  n ot on ly t ied up t he c ompany ' s  money wh ich 
Nas s er hoped t o  ac quire , but a l s o  an e s t imated three hundr ed 
and eight y m i l l i on d o l lar s of Egypt ian inve s tment s in c lud ing 
liqu id c ap it a l  and phy s i c a l  c ap it a l  such as war good s . The 
sec ond a spect of the r e spon se was a m i l i t ary one . A command o  
unit , a n  infantry unit , un it s o f  Canberra j et bomber s ,  and 
three carr ier s with accompanying craft were activated . The 
j et bomber squadr on s wer e sent t o  Malt a . Malta pr ov ided 
an air ba se within one thou sand mile s of C a iro , P or t  Said , 
and Alexandr ia . I t  a l s o  was le s s  than one thou sand mi le s  
t o  the Br it i s h  base a t  Cypru s  which wa s le s s  than two hundred 
and f ifty m i l e s  from the above ment ioned E gypt ian c it ie s . 
The three carr ier s were sent int o  the Medit erranean Sea  
and therefor e , on  E gypt ' s  d oor s tep . The se number s of  tr oops 
and ship s wou ld gradua l ly be expand ed t o  over f orty -three 
thou s and military per s onne l ,  twe lve thou s and vehic le s ,  
three hundr ed a ircraft , and one hundred war ship s . 2 6  
The French , und er S o c ia l i st leader , Premier G uy M o l let , 
a l s o  quickly re sponded t o  N a s ser ' s  move . On J u ly 3 0 ,  M o l le t  
pub l ica l ly prot e sted  the nat ion a lization o f  the canal , and 
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by the s e c ond of Augu st , in s tructed the French Medit erranean 
f leet fr om T ou lon t o  t ake up p o s itions which wou ld be in 
1 . . h h B . . h 1 . 2 7  c ose  c ooperat ion wit t e r i t i s  nava unit s . 
The two We stern p ower s star t ed t o  in i t iate p lans f or 
a j o int mi litary venture to  r emove Na s ser from power . The 
regain ing of the cana l wa s on ly a cover f or the ir mutua l  
p lans for Egyp t ' s  ru ler . F or reasons  of log i s t ic s and p o l i -
t i c a l  obj ective s , the mi litary operat ion deve loped and pro-
ceeded s lowly . The mi l it ary operat i on he ld pr i or ity over 
any d ip lomat ic avenue s f o l lowe d by the two power s . The 
mi litary preparedne s s  of Great Br i tain wa s not adequate t o  
a l low f or a r ap id imp lement at ion of the j oint mi litary oper-
at ion . In  add it ion t o  thi s , E den needed to p o litically  
j u st i fy a mil itary c our se  of acti rn. by out l ining the  p o l it i c a l  
obj e c t ive . 2 8  Thi s  obj e c t ive wou ld be the overthrow of Nas ser . 
Nas ser repre sented the pr ime thorn in both power s '  
sid e s . To  France , he wa s re spon s i b l e  for feeding the f lame s 
of the Algerian r e v o lt , and st irr ing up troub le in  Morocco 
and Tun i s ia . To  Br itain , he repre sented the cau se  of  her 
rap id d e c l ine in the area .  S e i z ure of  the canal  base , the 
canal comp any , the cana l , the f ee d ing of host i lit i e s  of 
the N at ional  Organ i z at ion of Cypri ot F i ght er s  ( E OKA ) in 
Cypru s ,  the verbal and t err or i st attacks on the Baghdad 
Pact c ountr ie s ' government s ,  and the supposed inf luence in 
G lubb ' s d i smi s s a l  would r emove any e ff ect ive Br it i sh pre -
sence and c ontro l .  
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The French mil itary preparations were  not hindered by 
pub lic op inion . The S oc ia l i st government , who s e  bas i c  
pr inc ip le s  d i s c ouraged war fare , had a str ong pub lic maj or ity 
favoring act ive m i l it ary actions again s t  N a s s er . The var i ­
ou s governments ' u s e  o f  l ikening Na s s er t o  Hitler and 
Mu s so lin i on ly fue led popu lar support . The maj or hindrance s 
to  the French government wa s manpower and mi litary e quipment . 
Most of her strength wa s t ied up in the f ighti ng in A lger i a . 
Not enough ships , aircraft , and manp ower c ou ld be col lected 
to  go it a l one , so Franc e had to wait f or Gre at Br itain to act . 
France did not remain idle in the p er i od fr om July 2 6  t o  
October 3 1 . I t  started t o  cult ivat e a working re lat i onship 
between it s e l f  and I srae l . France ' s  d e s ire t o  get r evenge on 
Na s s er for his  gr ievou s  act ion s at her expense  found fert i le 
ground in Octo ber of 1 9 5 4 . I srae l wanted an a l ly who wou ld pro­
vide the ne c e s s ary mod ern weapons  with which it  c ould ma intain 
superior ity over i t s  Arab ne ighbor s . I srae l ' s  sma l l  p opula­
t ion of s li ght ly over one mi l li on could not match that of her 
host i le ne ighbor s , wh ich combine d me ant over thirty mi l l ion 
enemie s .  I srae l ne eded t op qua lity equipment t o  off set th i s  
gap unt i l  her popu lat i on c ou ld b e  large enough to  adequat e ly 
de fend i t s e l f with weap on s pr oduced in I srae l .  I sr a e l  turned 
t o  France who glad ly s id e s t epped the Tripart ite  dec larat ion 
and supp lied I srae l with the de s ired we ap on s . Around June 
of 1 9 5 5 , s e cret talks of a j oint military action again s t  E gypt 
with the de s ire to  remove Na s s er had start ed . With the 
French we ap ons , I srae li f orc e s  struck int o E gypt ian terr i t ory 
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in v i o lat ion of the 1 9 4 9  United  Nati o n s  armistice  agre ement . 
The se  we ap ons caused Nas ser t o  s e ek arms , eventually succe e d -
i n g  with the C zecho s l ovakian government w i t h  S oviet a s s i st -
ance . Franc e fed the f ir e s  o f  an arms r ac e  and he lpe d  
open a breach i n  D u l le s ' c ont ainment wa l l . To Fran c e , 
N a s s er 1 s  s e i zure o f  t he Sue z Cana l ,  the company , and it s 
1 h 1 . d f . 2 9  per sonne meant t e ong awa it e cause or ac t io n . 
The d ip lomat ic actions deve loped by D u l l e s  in  re sponse 
t o  a Br it i sh and Fre nch init iat ive for a un ited three p ower 
re spon s e  to Nas ser pr oved t o  become a p o s s ibly und e s ired s o lu-
t ion ; there fore a valid exc u s e  for the inva s i on by France 
and Great Britain had to be d eve lop e d  and imp lemented . To  
mo st Br i t i s h  sub j ect s and e sp e c i a l ly members of  Par l iament , 
it was an unattract i ve thought of worki ng with I srae l on any-
th ing . However , even Eden changed h i s  mind from h i s  ear l ier 
s tron g ly pr o -Arab leanings to quiet ly ignore the Franc o - I srae l i  
p lans . By October 1 3 ,  1 9 5 6 , Eden knew o f  the Franc o - I srae l i  
j oint chi ef  of  staff operat ions and arms supplie s .  By remain-
ing s i lent , he wa s i nd irect ly g iving hi s country ' s  permi s s i on 
to the p lan s . On Oct ober 2 5 , 1 9 5 6 ,  Eden with Guy Mo l let  
and Dav id B e n-Gur ion , I srae l ' s  Pr ime M i n i s t er , s i gned a 
secret agreement for j oint cooperat ion t o  achieve their 
prime obj ect ive , the overthrow of Nas ser and the d e s truc t i o n  
o f  his  government . E ventua l ly i t  wa s agre e d  upon that an 
I srae l i  raid int o E gypt t oward the c ana l would c on s t itute 
the excuse f or the Franc o - Br it i sh inv a s i on of Egypt . This 
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action allowed the two p ower s t o  act und er the 1 8 8 8  Treaty 
of C ons tant inop le and the 1 9 5 4  E gypt ian -Br it i sh agreement 
that in the event that the s afety of the canal wa s thre a t -
ened b y  an out s ide f orc e , they c ou ld re occupy t h e  canal t o  
. f k 3 0 protect it rom attac . 
The operation changed it s name thre e t ime s . F ir st it 
wa s c a l led Operat ion Hami lcar when the only part ic ipant s 
were Great Britain and France . The operation wa s change d ,  
and s o  wa s the t it le , when it was reali zed  that a differe nt 
plan wa s needed due to three key fact or s . F ir s t , the s i z e  
o f  the strike force had t o  b e  lar ger due t o  the Soviet we apons . 
More than two hundred modern aircraft , f ive hundred and th irt y 
Soviet bui lt armore d vehic l e s , f ive hundre d  art i l lery piec e s , 
and large amount s  o f  modern sma l l  arms made  the E gypt ian f orc e s  
super ior t o  tho se  o f  Great Britain ' s  a i r  a n d  sma l l  weapons  of  
which it s f orc e s  were compri sed . E c onomic r e stric t ions  and 
neglect of Br i t i s h  f orc e s  were beginning to be fe lt . A s e c on d  
cau se  was the nee d  for a number o f  amphibiou s and t ank tran s -
port ve s s e l s  t o  incre a s e  the punch of  the operat ion . The third 
point wa s the need for a d e ep harbor capab l e  of maintain ing 
the c ombined fleet . Cypru s ,  the c lo s e s t  ba s e  t o  E gypt , was n ot 
deep enough wh ich required Ma lt a  t o  be the main nava l ba se , but 
Malta wa s six sail ing days from the t arget area . Operation 
Hami lcar wa s scrapped for Op erat ion Mu skete er . Operation 
Musket e er changed the main land ing po int fr om Alexandria to 
P ort Said . Thi s would a l l ow the j oint for c e  t o  cut the E gypt ian 
f orc e s  in ha lf a long the canal leaving I srae l t o  t ake care of 
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the E gypt ian S i n a i  force s .  The Franc o - Br it i sh force wou ld 
not cut d own the canal port c i t i e s  and then push t oward 
Cairo . E v e ntua l ly , it a s sumed the t it le of  Mu sketeer incor -
porat i ng the Fre nch p lan o f  u s ing Port S a id a s  the key center 
. h . d f f . b b .  . d 3 1  wit s ix ays o s o  tening up o m  i n g  rai s .  
Eve ntua l ly , the mi litary operat i on inc luded over n inety 
thou sand m i l i tary per sonne l , one hundr ed and thirty war ship s , 
thr e e  hundred aircraft , and twe lve thou sand vehic l e s . The 
I srae l i s  d e feated the Egypt i an S i nai de fe n s ive force ( con s i st-
ing o f  one  hundred and fi fty tanks , one hundred and f orty 
art i l lery p ie ce s , s ixty j et a ircra ft , and fort y thou sand troop s ) 
by us ing one hundred and e i ghty tank s , one hundr e d  and f ifty 
art i l lery p i e ce s , one hundred and th irty a ircraft , and forty-
five thou sand troop s . The I srae l i s  s tarted the operation 
on  Oct ober 2 9  when it comme nced it s i n f i ltrat ion inva s ion into 
the S inai . The Fre nch provided French bu i lt and French fl own 
Mys tere IV ' s  prior t o  the announced i nva s ion of France and 
Br itain t o  prot ect the cana l . An u lt imatum st ipu lat ing a 
demi l it ar i zed  z one of ten m i l e s  on  each s i de of  the canal 
with a " p o l i c e  f orce " of the two p ower s would then occupy 
the z one s e parat ing Egypt i an and I srae l i  force s .  I f  Na s ser 
ac cepted the s e  t e rms , he  wou ld p o l i t i c a l ly be cut t i ng h i s 
own throat , and i f  he rej e ct ed it , wh i ch he did , he would 
pro vide the two with the e xcu se  to invad e . 
The i nvas ion started for the Br i t i sh and French on  
October 3 1 . M i l i t ar i ly ,  I srae l  had comp lete succe s s  o f  i t s  
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obj ect ive s : Fran c e  and Brit ain on l y  l imi ted suc ce s s  due t o  
the forced United S t at e s  cease  f ire . There were on ly thi rt y  
dead , o n e  hundre d  and thirty wo und e d , and ten aircraft d e -
stroyed for the t wo p ower s . I srae l had ten k i l le d and thirt y -
two woul lded . Egypt l o s t  virt u a l ly a l l  o f  it s air force and 
suffered extens ive l o s s e s  and c a sua lt i e s  in men and equipme nt . 
Whe n  the smoke c l e ar e d  a nd the s ands  covered the d e br i s , 
Eg ypt had b e c ome t he d i p l omat ic  vict or and Nas ser the sh ining 
1 d f A b . l "  3 2 ea er o ra nationa ism . 
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Chapt er F our 
Negotiat i o n s  Falter and War C l oud s Gather 
D u l le s ' d e n i a l  of  the irr i gation proj ect s e t  the whe e l s  
o f  Arab nati on a l i sm ro l l in g  whi ch gave the nec e s sary spark 
for mi litary act i on s by t h e  powers o f  Great Br i t ain , France , 
and I srae l . E i s enh ower ordered Dul l e s  t o  halt the war l ike  
p lan s of  the  Uni t e d  State s '  two European allies  b e f ore a war 
cou ld erup t and shatter wor ld peace . I f  thi s wa s n ot reason  
enough to  try t o  keep p e ace , 1 9 5 6  wa s a l s o  a pre s ident i a l  
e lect ion year for E i s enhower and hi s Se cretary of  State . 
7he immediat e United St ate s react ion to  Na s s er ' s  canal 
natio� al i zat ion proc lamation wa s three br ief sente nce s which 
d i s ap?roved o f  Na s s er ' s  actio n s  and s tated that other g overn­
me nt s affected  wou ld be c ontact ed . The next ma j or statement 
crit ic i z ed N a s s e r ' s  spee ch as to the tone of language u s ed 
when �e ferring to the U n i t e d  S t ate s .  This wa s a l s o  d irectly 
stat e d  to  Egypt ian Amba s sador Hu s s ein  by Acting Se cretary o f  
State Herbert Hoover , Jr . because S ecretary of State D u l l e s 
wa s away in South Amer ica maki ng a show of American fr iend ship 
and s upport . Whi l e  Dul l e s  was out of the Unit ed  State s ,  
Deputy Under - S e cretary o f  S tate Robert Murphy wa s s ent t o  
Lond o� to sound out t a lk s  regarding the s ituat i on imme d i ate ly 
fol l owing Na s ser ' s a ct i on s , D u l le s arrived in London f o l lowing 
his r eturn , and by Augu s t  2 ,  a j oint tr ipart ite s tat ement wa s 
i s sued . Thi s out l ined a r ough evaluat i on of the s it uat i on , 
p oint s of  c oncern regard ing the re s ult s of Nas s er ' s  action s , 
and the announc ement o f  a conference incorporat ing i nit i a l  
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signer s of  the 1 8 8 8  C o nvention wit h the princ i p l e  u s er s  o f  
the cana l . The l i s t  t o t a l e d  twenty-four nat i on s . T h e  c on ­
ference eventua lly entai led  t wenty-two nat ions  with G r e e c e  
re fusing d u e  to  the C yp ru s  a c t i o n s  o f  Gre at Br i t ain , a n d  E gypt 
r e fu s ing becau se  of t he init ia l word ing of the t r ipart ite  
statement which c ontained the  underlying mot ive o f  d i c tat ing 
to E gypt regard ing her own nati ona l action s . E gypt c on s i dered 
the canal a nation al  po s s e s s i on whi le the three p ower s c on s idered 
it  an internat i onal p o s s e s s i on . 1 
Wt. i l e  mi l it ary p lans were be ing deve lop e d  in E ur ope , 
Pre s ident E i s e nhower and Se cretary of State Du l le s  fa shi oned 
d i p l omat ic plan s  f or a p o s s i ble s o lut ion and made a pub l ic 
addre s s  exp lain ing America ' s  view of the s ituat i o n . D u l le s , 
in  an Augu st 3 pre s s  s tat eme nt , after re turning from the t a lk s  
in  Lo nd o n  between France and Great Britain , said , " We do not , 
however , want to  me et  v i o l ence  with violence . 11 2 Dul le s e ither 
vi ewed the qu ick mi l itary re s pon se  of the two power s as be ing 
standard acceptable rep l i e s  or he ign ored the t e n s i on s  and 
de s ire s behind the ir r e sp on s e s . He further hinted at the 
upcoming confere nce o f  t he twenty-four nat i o n s  as being a 
rat ional way to divert " the danger of violence . "  Th i s  wou ld 
leave vi olence a s  a p o s s ib l e  c our s e  open and wa s not in  k e e p ­
ing with t h e  stat eme nt of  n ot mee t ing vio lence with v i o lence . 
Dulle s al so  stat e s  t ha t  Na s s er ' s  s e i zure of  the c an a l  wa s for 
the s o le purpo s e  o f  promo t i ng " the grandeur of  E gyp t "  and not 
out of an economi c n e c e s s ity for obtaining the required fund s 
( 6 3 )  
for the Aswan proj e c t  now that the United Stat e s  had termi -
nated it s c ommi tme nt i n  a s s i s t ing it s imp lement ation . D u l l e s  
over s imp li fi e d  the  a c t i o n  in order t o  focu s pub l ic o p i n i on 
again st Na s s er . T h i s  wa s not conduc ive for deve loping mut ua l 
grounds f or c ompr omi s e . The legal status o f  the Sue z C ana l 
wa s not c lear ly d e f ined , becau s e  the Const ant i nop le  C on ference 
of 1 8 8 8  gave c onc e s s ion s to E gypt and to the maj or p ower s thus 
. b . . 3 creat ing am igu1t y . 
Also  on the t hird o f  August , E i s enhower and D u l l e s  pre-
s 0 nted a j oint t e lev i s i on and rad io report . T he Pre s id ent 
pre s ent ed a br i e f  introduc t ion and a c onc lu s i on . S e cretary 
Du lles  pr ovided the bulk of the pub l i c  br i e f ing o f  the s itu-
at ion . D u l le s u s ed  exc erpt s from Nasser ' s  s p e e ch i n  Egypt 
wh ich deve l oped a general addre s s  of Egypt ' s  pre s i dent to it s 
people . In  it , he u s e d  h i ghly emot ional  stat ement s p l aying 
on Arab nat i ona l i sm in expl a in i ng the nat iona l i zat i on of 
the canal . Dul le s r e i t e rated a few such as " t o  s c ore one 
tr iumph aft er another " for E gypt ' s  " grandeur " against  We s t ern 
" imper i a l i sm" . He stated  that the per sonn e l  of  the nat iona l -
i z e d  company had t o  c o n t i nue to  work or they wou ld b e  e li g i b le 
for arre st . Thi s  p o int wa s aimed at keep ing the one hundred 
and e ight y - seven p i l ot s  working as u sua l in order t o  prevent 
the French and Brit i sh the right to intervene under the 1 8 8 8  
art ic le of proper working order . One hundr ed and e i ght of the 
p i lot s wer e French and Br it ish , and two were Amer i c an . Dul l e s  
made the statement , " T o  p ermit this to go  uncha l l e nged woul d  
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be t o  enc ourage a breakdown of the int ernat i onal fabric 
upon wh ich t he s ecurit y and the we l l -be ing of a l l  people 
4 
depend . "  
F ir st o f  a l l , this  stat ement wa s an ind ire ct threat t o  
the E gypt ian governme nt . It  made no  re feren c e  to  the po s s i -
bi l it y  o f  a c ompr omi s e  be i ng reache d t o  sat i s fy the goa l s  o f  
both affected  s i d e s . S e condly , it did not rule  out vio lence 
as an a lternat i v e  but actua lly generat ed the impre s s ion t hat 
a c our se  of mi lit ary action wa s a viab le avenue for solving 
the s ituat i on . T h i s indirectly encour aged the p lans of Franc e  
and Great Br i ta i n . Thir d ly , there wa s no ment ion of upho lding 
the princ i p l e s  of the Uni ted Nat ions other than in conforming 
one ' s  a c t ion s to the recognit ion of internat ional law . The 
Unit ed  Nat i on s C harter and the Int ernat iona l C ourt of Jus t ic e  
s p e c i f icall y d i s approved of  the use of violence or aggre s s ion 
as a oeans of so lv ing a prob lem . Al l member s o f  the United 
Nat io n s  are p ledged to upho ld p eace and the princ iples  o f  it s 
chart er . D ul l e s had been avoid ing the United  Nations  due t o  
Panama ' s  re lat ion ship t o  the Panama Cana l fear ing that ne utra l 
and Soviet b l oc nati on s  wou ld exploit the i s sue , se curing 
Na s s er ' s p o s ition , and rai s i ng que s ti o n s  which the Unit ed S tat e s  
did not want a sked  i n  an open forum o f  wor ld nat i ons . 5 
Du l le s d i d  not fore s e e  i t s  fai l ure becau s e  of  the force s  
and princip le s which were be ing repre s ent ed . However , i f  
it d i d  fail , t he United Stat e s  was not forma l ly c ommitted i n  
any s p e c i fi c  cour s e . What c ourse  of  act ion the United Stat e s  
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would t ake betwe e n  July 2 6  and Oct ober 3 1  now became cru­
c ia l . At no time was the United S t at e s ' official  policy 
made known to  any o f  the key c ombat ant s by Dulle s .  Egypt 
never expe c t ed mi l itary p lans to crys ta l l i z e . E d e n  did not 
c lear l y  det ermine what the United S tates  would do i f  France 
and Great Br itain imp leme nt e d  the ir p lans . Eden v iewed the 
movement of the United State s Sixth F l ee t  as pre parat i on to  
keep the  Soviet Union out  o f  the  str ike , and s ince  no  c lear ­
cut refu s a l  o f  a m i l itary act ion wa s made b y  D u l l e s , the 
United Stat e s  would step a s ide  and p o s sibly  let Operat ion 
Mu sket e er reach its p lanned c onc lu s ion . Franc e d i d  not 
fe e l  i t s e lf d ep end ent on United S tat e s  act ions s ince  Algeria 
kept any c lear thought s by the French government fr om ent er ­
ing the s i tuation . T h e  purpose o f  D u l l e s ' amb i guous stance 
wa s to keep the United Stat e s  from becoming entang led in the 
s i tuation , c a lm e l ection anx i e t i e s  of the voter s ,  and to 
ma intain fr iendly r e lation s with Arab countri e s . 6 
The conclus ion of the t e le v i s ion and rad io rep ort by 
Pre sident E i s e nhower wa s very imp ortant . E i s e nhower stated 
that Du l le s  app e ared t o  have c omp l e t e d  his lat e s t  t ask 
with re s p e ct to  the princ i p l e s whi c h  h i s  post  repvesented . 
The princ ip l e s  behind h i s  p o s t , and for th i s  spec i f ic t ime 
accord ing t o  E is enhower , were " t o  upho l d  the inter e s t s  o f  
the United S tate s i n  the international fie ld with due re -
gard f or fairne s s  t o  every other nati on and with the obj e c ­
tive of promo t i ng peac e  in the wor l d . 11 7 E i s e nhower , i n  h i s  
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memoir s ,  further s t at e d  that he wa s f latly again s t  the u s e  
of viol ence  i n  so lving t he Sue z cri s i s , and that h e  spe c i -
fically want e d  th i s  made c l ear t o  G r e at Br itain and Franc e .  
E i s enhower viewe d  d i p l omacy a s  the o n ly viable avenue for 
ach ieving an equitable and accep t ab le compromi se  for a l l  
. . 1 . 1 d 8 pr 1nc 1p e s  invo ve . 
The S ov i et Union d i d  not remain idle  during thi s  period . 
On July 3 1 , Nikita Khrushche v ,  Communi st Party Leader , mad e  
a stat ement support ive o f  Nas ser t s  act i o n s  which s a i d  that 
pre ssure p o l i t i c s  were not product i ve or s upp ort ive of fur -
thering peac e . He added that such a c our s e  of  reckle s sn e s s  
and ag gre s s iv e  act i o n s  wou ld on ly harm the int ere s t s  of the 
We ster� p ower s  in the Middle East . The grav ity of  the s i t u -
ation wa s reduced to the Sue z Can a l  Company ' s  stockho lders 
a s  the only one s who were affect e d , and even this wa s after 
the y had ma de  a ti dy pr ofit exp l oit ing the canal and E gypt . 
One other stat ement mad e by him wa s that the Soviet Union 
stood behind all c ountr i e s  who wer e working to  " free them-
se lve s from c o l onial ens lavement . " By N ovember 4 of 1 9 5 6 , 
it wa s quit e obvious that the S ov i et Union was not going t o  
a l low Hungary t o  obt a in p o l i t i c a l  free dom from the Soviet 
brand of  c o lonial enslavement . 9 
I t  i s  important to  note that from the s tart of Na s s e r ' s  
nat iona l i zation of  the Sue z Cana l , the Soviet Union made a 
c lear s tand in  support of  Nas ser . This  not only increased 
the i n f luence o f  the Soviet Union in  Egypt , but al so  
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furthe red Sov i et acceptance among Arab nationa l i s t s  from 
other c ountr ie s . T o  promo t e  thi s  windfa l l  the Soviet U n i o n , 
through unoff i c i a l  Soviet-c ontro l le d  j ournal s ,  cr it i c i z e d  
I srae l ' s  leaders for mak ing me nac i n g  st atement s warning o f  
war be t ween I srae l  and E gypt . The s e  s t atement s were due t o  
the border dep l oyment of the S o v i e t  weapon s , the increas e d  
f edaye en ra ids , and Na s ser ' s  continual V o ice broad c a st s c a l l ­
i ng for I srae l ' s  d e s truct ion . The S ov i et Union i gnored the s e  
rea s o� s  in an att empt to  s ave face with the Arabs be cau s e  o f  
it s July 1 7  agreement t o  s e l l  I srae l forty percent o f  it s 1 9 5 7  
oi l n e e d s . Whatever s i de looked t o  be ripe for Sov i et inf luence 
re ceived S oviet support . The Sov i e t s p laye d both s ides  o f  t he 
Middle East  for a l l  it wa s worth s o  a s  to  accomp l i sh the d e ­
s ired goal of creating a M i d d l e  E a s t  Soviet -c ontr o l l e d  s tat e .
1 0 
An int ere st ing devel opment oc c urre d in 1 9 5 6 . The Sovi et 
Unio� creat ed a new c ommit t e e  c a l l e d  The Sov iet Committee o f  
S o l id ar i t y  of the Countr i e s  o f  A s i a  and Afri ca . This  
c ommit t e e ' s  ma in purp ose  wa s to  t ak e  advantage of radical  
sent i�e nt s and mi l itant revo lut i onary movement s i n  the 
countr i e s  which fell  under it s j ur i s d i ct ion . I t  was to 
exp l o i t  the se  movement s or governme nt s so the Soviet s ' i n ­
f luen c e  would become a cruc i a l  g u i d ing force for their a c ­
t ion s . They r e a l i z e d  that a t o o l  f or Soviet advancement lay 
d ormant in the s e  group s . Once  they were drawn int o  the 
S ov ie L  c amp through finan c i a l , p o l it i c a l , and material  a i d , 
the y wou ld become susc ept i b l e  t o  S o v i et d ominat ion . A t o o l  
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of the Soviet Union which d id not re s emble the origin a l  wa s 
there f ore create d .  Na s s er opened the d oor o f  Arab nat io na l -
i sm whi ch wa s made  u p  of v arying degree s of mi l itancy . D u l l e s '  
re j e c t ion of the irrigat i on loan he lped the S o v i et Union t o  
bec ome the new s ourc e  o f  a s s is t ance . The canal ' s  nat i ona l -
i zat i on and subsequ ent S ov iet  public s upport for the a c t i o n  
deve loped a new image of t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  as an Arab bene­
fac t or . 1 1  
D u l le s ' t e l e v i s ion and rad i o  broadcast s d i d  not g o  un -
noti c e d  in Great Br itain and Franc e . They rea l i z e d  that 
Du l le s  did not c on s i der m i l i tary ac t i o n s  a s  the pr imary 
avenue . They did not c on s i d er that he was aga inst  the u s e  
o f  v i o lence i f  dip loma t i c  channe l s  were s at i s factor i ly tried . 1 2  
The t�o powers were  de termine d t o  defend their inter e s t s , in-
f luenc e ,  and power in  the  are a . They be came adamant c oncern-
ing t:-i.e imp ortanc e of the area , and that any inter fere nc e s  or 
di sturbanc e s  wou ld not be at the ir c o s t , but rather c o st ly 
t o  tho s e  who tried i t . E den , in Apr i l  o f  1 9 5 6 , stated in 
c lear tone s his  governme nt ' s  view of the Middle East . " The 
unint errupted suppl y  of o i l  was l itera l ly vit a l  t o  our e c onomy 
. I said I thought I mu st be ab s o lutely b l unt about the 
. 1 ld f . h f . t "
1 4  
o i  , b e c au s e  we wou i g  t or i . Both count r i e s  were 
c a l l i ng N a s s er e ither a Middle  East  Hit ler or  Mus s o lini who 
had t o  be s t opped . Thi s wa s their area , and they wou ld han -
d le t he problem without interference i f  the d ip l oma t i c  chan -
ne l s  fa i l ed . The two p ower s , wh en confront e d  by the gr owing 
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S oviet st atement s  o f  support for Nas ser , did not c on s ider the 
threat of Soviet i nt ervent i o n  a s  a po s s ib i l it y  because of the 
Unit e d  Stat e s  Navy . 1 4  
Thi s hard line st anc e wa s he lped by the knowledge that 
the United Stat e s  S ixth F le et had redep loyed in  accordanc e  
with s e cret contingency p l an s . The s e  p lan s were d e s igned t o  
k e e p  the Soviet Navy i n  check i n  t h e  event that a c onfront a ­
tion between the two i n  the area might occur . The S ixth 
F leet , operat ing in the Sue z are a ,  st eamed e a s tward . The 
Seventh F l eet shi fted into the South China S e a , and it s 
amphibiou s c omponents mov e d  t oward the Per s i an Gul f and the 
Red S e a .  I t  appeared that the f le e t s were c l o s ing the avenue s 
to  S o v iet Communi s t  int er ferenc e .  Eden and Mo l le t  did not 
know the op erat ional gu ide l ine s o f  the f le et c orrunanders , 
and t here fore a s sumed that i t s  pre s ence  wa s to  keep the 
Sov i e �  Union phy s i cally out of the area and any involveme nt . 1 5  
'l'ihat the two p ower s  d i d  not know wa s the operat ional 
order s of the fleet c orrunander s . J .  C .  Wyl i e , i n  h i s  art i c le , 
"The S ixth Fleet and Amer ican Dip lomac y" , provi d e s  a short 
summary of the general order s : " ( l )  t o  be a lert and ready 
in  ca s e  the s itua t i on expanded int o  ·a  maj or c on f l i c t ; ( 2 )  
t o  prot ect and evacuate United Stat e s  c it i z en s  from Egypt 
and the other active c ount r i e s  of the Middle East ; and ( 3 )  
t o  avo id  be c oming involv ed loca l ly , but t o  try and re strain 
the a c t i on s  of tho se  alre ady involved on both s i d e s . 11
1 6  
I t  me ant that the Navy wou ld keep the S oviet Union out , but 
the order s al so  meant tha t the Navy wou ld try to prevent any 
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further mi l itary mov e s  by Franc e , Great Br itain , and I srae l . 
The United S tate s d i d  not ma int ain a neutra l p o s i t ion and 
would become an arb itrator if forced to by the d e ve lopme nt 
of a mi li tary s i t uat i on such as war . E d e n , M o l l e t , Ben-Gur ion , 
and Na s s er did not l ook very far ahead and hen c e  s aw only 
what they want ed t o . The Soviet Union s aw a very optimist ic 
future for its own i n f luence in  the area . The United Stat e s , 
under E i s enhower , s aw a cr itical s it uat i on whi ch t hreat ened 
peace and allied s tabi lity . Dul le s saw a crit i c a l  mi litary 
s ituat i on whi ch had to  be fore s t a l l e d  inde f init e ly by diplo­
macy , so  a c ompromi s e  c ould have the ne c e s sary amount of t ime 
to be a fait a c c omp l i . 
To th i s  purp o s e , Dul l e s  inst itut ed a twenty- four nat i on 
convent ion on the Sue z Cana l . The nat io n s  a sked t o  att end 
were : Egypt , I t a l y , S pain , the United Ki ngdom , France , the 
Nether land s , Turke y , the Soviet Union , Austra lia , the F ederal 
Repub l i c  of Germany , I ndone sia , Norway , Cey lon , Iran , Pak i s t an , 
Denmark , Greece , Japan , Swed en , Ethiopia , I n d ia , New Z ealand , 
and the Uni ted S t at e s . Dul l e s  reali zed that by narrowing the 
s ituat ion to  key p o int s , removing p o l i t i c a l  c oncern s , the 
cri s i s c ould be d e f lat ed and a last ing compromi s e  secure d . 
The purpo s e  of the me et ing wa s not to  produc e  a b inding 
statement of a maj ority of a s ituat ion , but to produce a 
spe c i f ic s e t  of gu i d e l ine s and an understand ing of the s itu­
at io n . Egypt refu s e d  to  at t e nd becau s e  of the in it ial three 
power stat ement re gard ing the canal . Na s s er wou ld not commit 
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hi s p o s i t ion a s  yet due t o  h i s  v i ew that the variou s cana l 
users  wou ld  not re gard the s ituat i on a s  s eriou s , and that 
Franc e and G r e at Br it ain wou ld not overrea ct . Gre ece ref u s ed 
to  a t t e nd be cau s e  of Great Br itain ' s  invo lvement in Cypru s . 
Du l l e s real i z e d  that even without Egypt ' s  formal part ic ip a -
tion , the s ituat ion c ou ld b e  d e f i n e d  a s  t o  what t h e  var ious  
. . b h l '  . 1 7  intere s t e d  nat ion s thought a out t e c ana s op erati on . 
Dul le s had thre e p ower b l oc s t o  man ipu l at e  during t he 
me et ing . F ir st and foremo st wa s the S o v i e t  Union . The 
S oviet  U n i on a imed at preventing any f orma l union again s +  
Na s s er ' s  p o s it i on . The Soviet repre s entat ive , Shep i lov , 
triec t o  se cure Ind ia ' s repre s e nt at i v e , Men on , as  the pre s i -
dent o f  the c onferenc e , thus  hoping t o  s e cure supp ort from 
the neutr a l  b lo c . The s e cond bloc , the ne utra l s ,  repre s ente d 
by Menon , were trying t o  defend Na s s er ' s  move fr om the p o s i -
tion o f  nat ional  s e l f-d e terminat io n out s ide  o f  the two super -
power s .  The third bloc Du l l e s  had t o  overc ome wa s that of 
Great Br itain and France , who wanted t o  use the c onference 
as a� avenue t o  chast i s e  Na s s er and f orm a s o l id active front 
agains t  E gypt . D ul l e s  reali z e d  that the S o v i et Union wa s 
working for a p o l it ical  advanc ement of it s i n f luence by us i ng 
the canal ' s  nat iona li zat i on as it s avenue . He al so  rea l i zed  
that i t  wa s in  I nd i a ' s  se lf - intere s t  t o  support the right s of  
ot her neutral nat i on s  such a s  E gypt so  a s  t o  further India ' s  
own independent deve l opme nt . Dulle s c learly v i ewe d revenge 
a s  the und er lying int ent i on s  behind Britain ' s  and France ' s  
act i on s . 
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D u l le s ma st er fu l ly n e g ot iat ed the path of the c onference 
and generat e d  a r e f l e ct ive  e va luat ion of the int ere s t �  o f  
the maj or ity of nat ions  w i t h  a v i t a l  int ere s t  in  the c ana l . 
She p i l ov tried  t o  maneuver t he conference into arriving at 
a unit ed  opinion with no c oncrete v o t e . Be s ides  us ing it a s  
a forum t o  exp ound Soviet rhet ori c a imed at Arab and third 
wor ld c ountr ie s , the c onference be c ame a prime opportunity 
to  d i srupt any propo s a l s  which might be  e ffect ive agains t  
Egypt . Dul le s  s i d e s tepped the forma t i on of a s p e c i fic agenda 
for the c onf ere nc e , and re c omme nd ed t hat th i s  t ime be u s e d  
for the pre s e ntation of their government s '  v i ewpo int s .  Thu s 
he av oided a sta l l i ng of the conference on pro c edura l que s t i on s , 
and by the s e cond me eting , be gan the crit ical d i s cu s s ion of 
th C' • • 1 8  e 0 � e z  s ituat io n . 
D u l l e s ,  u s ing quotat ion s from N a s s er ' s  nat iona l i zat ion 
speec� o f  July 2 6 , 1 9 5 6 , t ouched on the  fears of  mo st of  
the  s s c ond and third wor l d  c ountr i e s pre sent at the  confer-
enc e . He further deve loped the l e g a l  standing of the cana l 
as an int ernat ional waterway , s ervi ng one - s ixth of  a ll s e a - ·  
born t:rade , a s  t h e  maj or l ink of  " int erdependence " of a l l  
nat io n s . Dul le s , u s ing quotat ion s from an official S ov i et 
government pre s s  s tat ement of Augu s t  9 plus  the Augu s t  1 2  
propo s al by Pre s i d ent Nas s er , p lante d  s e e d s  for a p o s s ib le 
j o int d ec i s i on geared for a c oncret e s o lut ion , in order not 
to  generate mere l y  an opinion . The Soviet stat ement pra i s ed 
the c onf erence a s  a way t o  create a peacefu l  so lut ion for 
the Su e z  C ana l that wou ld be  ac ceptab le t o  a l l  c oncerned . 
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Na s ser ' s  s tatement r e c orrunended that a new internat ional 
treaty should be creat ed to s et t l e  the fears and c omp la i nt s 
of a l l  i n v o lved regard ing the S u e z C anal . Dul l e s  said that 
the s e  stat ement s c l e ar l y  agr e e d  with a l l  concerned that a 
corre c t ion o f  the s ituat i on wa s n e c e s s ary and t hat the con-
1 9  feren c e  wa s an opportune method , 
D u l le s attempted t o  shi ft away from the S oviet prop o s a l  
o f  a j oint opinion t o  a unit ed maj ority p o s it ion o n  the s o lu -
t i o n  c f  t h e  Sue z prob lem . T h i s  wou ld bring t o  bear on Nas s er 
con s ic erabl e  wor ld opinion aga inst  him , and p � s s ib ly pre s s ure 
him i�to a c oncre t e , j u st ,  and mutua l l y  acceptable so lut ion 
for t�e s ituat i on . The f ina l re s u l t  o f  the twenty-two p ower 
Londo� C onf erence was an e i ght e e n  nat ion prop o s a l  ( repr e s ent -
ing n � n e t y - five p ercent o f  al l canal tonnage ) based on 
Dul le s ' p l an which rec ommended : 
:peration of the canal wo uld be come the re spon s i ­
jl l i  t y  o f  an int ernat i onal board set  u p  b y  treaty 
and as s o c iated with the Unit e d  N at i on s . E gypt wou ld 
e n j o y  repre s e ntation on such a board , but no  one 
c ountry wou ld dominat e it . I t  wou ld be so  c omp o s e d  
a s  t o  a s s ure t h e  be s t  p o s s ib l e  op erat i o n  and t o  
prec lude favorit ism o r  prej u d i c e . The treaty woul d  
nake adequate pr ovi s ion f or t h e  payment o f  fair 
comp ensation t o  the Suez  C an a l  C ompany 
The treaty wou ld e nt i t l e  Egyp t  t o  an equitable 
r e t urn from the canal ' s  operat ion and to t ake 
into account E gypt ian s o vere ignty over and a l l  
leg it imate E gypt ian ri ght s i n  the c anal . The 
I nt ernat ional C ourt of Ju s t i c e  at Th e Hague 
wou ld be empowered to appoint a corruni s s io n  of 
arbitration hav ing j ur i s d i c t i on over �01 d i s ­
put e s  ari s ing from the s e  last point s . 
All  o f  the s e  p o int s , except an int ernat iona l board for i t s  
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operat ion , were incorporated in the final te n-po int dec lara-
t io n  o n  Apr i l  2 4 , 1 9 5 7  by the E gypt ian government . Du l l e s ' 
1 1 t . f f . 1 . 2 1  prop o s a  wa s tru y repre senta  ive o a air s o  ut ion . 
The four nat io n s  which d id not support Du l le s ' p l an 
wer e  I nd i a , C eylon , Indone s i a , and the Soviet Union . They 
s upp ort ed the propo s a l  by Menon of  I nd ia c a l l ing for an in-
t ernat ional  adv i s ory group which , repre s e nt ing the v ar i ou s  
u s er s , could as s i st i n  E gypt ' s  op erat ion o f  the cana l . 
E g ypt would , under int ernat i onal law , guarantee usage by 
a l l  nGt i o n s  and c ont inued oper at ion of +he cana l . Egypt 
wou ld d e c i d e  t o l l s  and char g e s  in ord er t o  c omp et it ive ly 
ge n e r � t e  a pr ofit . Any u s e r s  who f e l t  they were un j u s t l y  
tre at e d  wo uld take t h e  matter be fore the Wor ld Court , and 
E h d • ct  b . d . . 2 2  gypt s oul abi e y it s e c i s ion . 
C nder this propo s a l , Egypt wa s not bound by any c l ause s 
excep� open navi gat ion and adequate deve lopment or ma inten-
anc e . Egypt would be able to  do a s  it pleas ed , p l u s  I nd ia ' s 
propo s a l  imp lied that any nat i on had the right t o  nat i o na l i z e  
a n  in�erna l re s ource . She p i l ov u s ed h i s  s upport of  Menon 
t o  gain the favor of  the neutra l nat io n s  and to  launch an 
attac� on  the e ighte en nat ion prop o s al a s  an attempt by 
the U n i t e d  S tate s to re s t ore a c o lonia l i s t  regime . He 
tr i ed t o  portray the Soviet Union as a prot ector of  the 
weak . One point of Menon ' s  propo s a l  become incorp orated 
i nt o  � he E gypt ian d e c larat ion of April 2 4 , 1 9 5 7 : i . e . , that 
c ooper at ion betwe en the u s er s  and the E gypt i an C anal C ompany 
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wou ld b e  enc ourag ed t o  h e lp impr ove c onf id ence  and the manag e -
2 3  
ment of t h e  cana l .  
The London C onference last ed from August 1 6  t o  2 3 , 
1 9 5 6 , On  August 2 3 , the e ight e en nat i o n s  v o t ed f or a f ive  
member c ommittee t o  br ing t he prop o s a l  and exp lain it to  
the E gypt ian g overnment . This  c ommittee c ou ld not change 
any of t h e  prop o sa l s , but it cou ld f e e l  out t he p o s it i on 
wi th N a s s er in the hope of c ontr ibut ing mut u a l  und er stand ing 
t oward a c ompr omi s e  in the future . The cha irman of the 
comm i t t e e  was Au stra l i a ' s Pr ime Min i s ter R obert Menz i e s  
wh o wou ld be accompan ied by the delegate s from the United State s ,  
Eth i op i a , Sweden , and Iran . The United Stat e s  r epre sentat ive 
was the U n ited Stat e s  A s s i s tant Und er -Secretary of Stat e  Loy 
Hend er s on . Be s ide s d e liver ing the e ight een n at ion pr op o sal , 
they a l s o d e l ivered fu l l  tran script s of the me et ing s , the 
opp os ing v i ews on internat iona li zat ion , and the Ind ian 
pr op o s a l . 2 4  
T hr oughout the c on f eren ce , the S oviet U n i on wa s out -
maneuv er ed by a We s t ern d ominated ma j ority . On the f in a l  
day , She p i l ov tr ied  t o  g e t  a draft pas sed whic h  wou ld hav e 
pu b l i c ly b ound any Sue z s o lut ion to  peaceful mean s on ly , 
thereby r u l ing out f or c e  a s  a way to  s o lve the s ituat ion . 
Thi s was prev ent ed by Chr i s t ian P ineau , the French F ore ign 
M i n i s t er , who c ited She p i l ov ' s  ear l ier p o s i t i on that 
the S ov ie t  Union had r e fu sed any f inal c ommunique to be 
p a s sed . Shepi lov wa s st opped by his  own e ar l ier safeguard . 
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On Augu s t  2 4 ,  She p i l ov mad e a public pre s s  stat ement in 
Lond on s t at in g  that the e ighteen nat i on pr op o s a l , based on 
the Unit ed Stat e s ' pr op o s al , was found ed on  " an unacceptab le 
1 . 1 .  . . " 2 5  c o  on ia i s t  p o s it ion . He crit ic i z ed the five  member 
c ommit t e e  mi s s ion c a l l i ng it p ower le s s  and s t at ing that the 
b ourge o i s ie c la s s e s  who he ld the o ld c an a l  c ompany s t ock 
were behind the pr op o s a l . On  Augu s t  2 3 ,  Khru shchev said 
v o lunt e er s  fr om the S ov i et Union wou ld c ome to E gypt ' s  aid if 
the We s t  attacked t o  regain the c anal . The un of f i c ia l  Sov iet  
c on tro l led newspaper , I zve st j a ,  c on s idered the  c onference a 
f a i lur e and that E g ypt wou ld tr iumph over the p owerp lay of 
2 6  the We s t . 
The f ive member c ommittee met with N a s ser from Augu st 2 8  
t o  Sep� ember 9 .  The me et ing end ed in fai lure . Men z i e s c ou ld 
not ne g ot i ate  chang e s , and Nas ser wa s u t i l i z ing Soviet in-
f luence to wi thho ld any c ompr omis e s . Na s s er r e a l i z e d  that 
if he c ou ld sta l l  the proce s s  of negot iat i on , he wou ld 
se cure the c an a l  by a fa it acc omp l i . E g ypt a l s o pr obed 
the p o s s ib i lit ie s of ut i li z ing a Unit ed Nat ion s S e c urity 
Counc i l  r e s o lut ion . Thi s  re s o lution wa s a imed at Great 
Br itain and Fran c e  in reference to the ir m i l it ary operat i on 
a s  ac t s  of aggre s s ion wh ich wou ld be in v i o lat ion of the 
b a s ic pr inc ip le s of the charter , The only pr ob lem in thi s 
c our se wou ld be the veto p ower s of Fran ce and Great Br itain 
p lu s  the p o s s ib i l ity of hav ing a r e s o lut ion pa s s e d  which 
wou ld int ern at ion a l i z e  the canal . Thi s wou ld hav e wr ought 
h . ff N I • • 2 7 t e opp o s it e  e ect  on a s ser s p o s it ion . 
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The p o s s ibi l i t y  of ut i l i z ing the Unit ed Nat i o n s  wa s 
open t o  a l l  s ide s i nv o lved in the c onf l i c t . The previous ly 
stat e d  r e a s on s  a s  t o  why Egypt was he s itant t o  u se the 
United N at ion s were s imi lar to Great Br i t a in ' s  a nd France ' s . 
Great Br it ain and France were fearfu l of u s ing t he United 
Nat i on s  f or thr e e  rea s on s . The f ir s t  wa s the f e ar of hav ing 
the ir prop o s ed re s o lu t i on turned ag ain st them . This  wou ld 
re su lt in the ir ac t i on s  being ca lled  aggre s s ive , thereby 
f or c i ng world op in ion t o  s ide with Egypt . Thi s wou ld 
we aken Eden ' s po s it ion , and the imper ia l i s t  gr oup of the c on ­
servat ive part y ,  a l l owi ng the Labor P ar t y  under Hugh G ait ske ll 
to gain p ower . The s e c ond re ason was the vet o p ower of the 
Soviet U n i on . Thi s wou ld be brought t o  bear aga inst  the ir 
ac t io n s . The Soviet  U n i on had a tra ck re c ord whi ch was fa-
vorab le t o  Egypt whe n it  vetoed a r e s o lut ion in 1 9 5 4 which 
wou ld OJen the canal t o  I srae l i  shipp ing whi ch had been re -
fu sed s ince  1 9 5 1 . The third reason wa s that the ir re s olution 
might be wat er ed d o wn , removing any repr imand s on Egypt , and 
ac tual ly ge nerat ing a c ompr omise s o lut ion . Thi s wou ld have 
und one the ir g o a l  of d e stroying Na s s er and regaining contr o l  
o f  t he canal . 2 8  
Du l le s  wa s he s itant t o  use  the Un ited N at io n s  because 
of one ma j or f ac t or , the S ov i e t  Union . The Sov i e t s  c ou ld 
vet o any prop o s a l  in t he Security C oun c i l  which might create 
a l e g i t imate  s o lut ion to a tense s i tuat ion . Thi s wou ld in-
crea se  the S ov i e t  i n f luence with the Arab nat ionali sts . In  
add i t i on to  thi s ,  the S ov iet veto c ou ld be u s ed  by  France 
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and Great Br i t a in a s  an excu se t o  j u s t ify the ir u s e  of f or c e  
b y  stat ing that a l l  other avenue s  have f a i led , Du l l e s  a l s o  
rea l i zed a n  omin ous warning from the S ov ie t  London C onferen c e  
repre sentat ive , Shep i l ov , and fr om t he Krem l in i t s e lf . 
Thi s warning was  in regard s t o  br oaden in g  the que st i on of 
the canal ' s  n at i on a l i z at i on to make a l l  maj or cana l s  and 
strait s  i nt ernat ional . This me ant the Panama Canal wou ld 
be br ought int o the d i s cu s s ion , and p o s s ib l y  removed from 
United Stat e s  c ontr o l  by giving it an in t er nat iona l statu s . 
Du l l e s  wa s n ot g o ing t o  allow the S o v i et U n i on t o  br oaden 
the que s t i on in ord er t o  str ike at  the Un ited  State s . 2 9  
With the f a i lur e of the London pr op o s a l , Du l le s  launched 
his next d ip l omat ic p lan for a p e ac e fu l  s o lut ion of the 
s ituat ion . D u l l e s  pr op o sed a Sue z C ana l U ser ' s A s s oc iat ion 
( SCUA ) wh ich G reat Britain and Fran c e  a u i ck ly agreed to sup -
port . SCUA wou ld repre sent a l l u s er s  wh o w i sh to  j oin � I t  
would b e  an in t ernat ional body o f  u s er s  who wou ld , i n  e f -
feet , lea se  the r ight o f  pa s s age fr om E g ypt . S CUA wou ld 
pr ov ide i t s  own p i lot s ,  collect the t o l l s  of S CUA member s ,  
and g ive  Egypt an appropriate share . It  wou ld depend on the 
coop erat i on of the Egyptian gov ernment , but . in e ffect , 
it remov ed t ot a l  E g ypt ian contro l  of the canal . The State 
D epartment announced on September 1 2  that t he United 
Stat e s  wou ld par t i c ipate if S CUA wa s advanced by the e ighte en 
agreed nat i on s of  t he London C onference and have its  bas i s  
i n  the 1 8 8 8  C on s tant in op l e  Convent ion . D u l l e s  a l s o  added 
that i f  the e ighteen n at i on s  did not j oin S CUA , it wou ld be 
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based on a three party system . He further p o in t ed out that 
if the cana l was b l ocked to SCUA ship s , then the path ar ound 
the Cape of Afr ica wou ld be u sed . The cana l wou ld not be 
f d b b d . 1 3 0 or ce op en y gun oat ip omacy . 
Du l l e s  warned Eden that SCUA mu st not be  u sed a s  an ex-
cuse f or force again st Egypt . Du l le s  r e a l i z e d  that E den and 
Mo llet  were hop ing to t ie the Unit ed  S tate s with them in a 
hard l ine p o l icy again s t  Egypt . I f  such were a l l owed , the 
chance that f or c e  wou ld be u sed wou ld great l y  incre ase . 
Sinc e July 2 7 ,  Du l l e s  had been informed of E d en ' s and M o l let ' s  
j o int view that Nas ser had t o  be de str oyed t hrough a m i l itary 
operat i on . Du l l e s  tr ied  t o  prevent the u s e  of force as the 
t 1 h . . 3 1 avenue o so  ve t e s ituat ion . 
Dul le s wa s not a lone in trying t o  ha lt the dr ive t oward 
force . Pre s ident E i s e nhower c ommunicated d irec t ly t o  Eden 
Amer ica ' s  p o s i t i on on the u se o f  f orce  t o  s olve the s ituat ion . 
E i s enhower , in his  letter of July 3 1 t o  E d e n , re sponded to  
a cable fr om Eden on Ju ly 2 7 p lu s  the  informa t i on d e l ivered 
by D eputy Under - S e cret ary of State Robert Murphy fr om Eden and 
Har o ld MacMi llan Chanc e l l or of the E xche quer . E i senhower 
was shocked to he ar that the main p o l icy of Eden wa s t o  
" emp loy force without de lay" and not to  f o l l ow peaceful 
3 2 mean s . E i s enhower adv i s e d  against even the thought of 
mi l itary plan s  before a l l  other avenu e s  had been exhau sted . 
Throughout the r e s t  of the E is e nhower - -Eden c ommun ique s , 
E i s e nhower c lear ly adv i s ed again s t  mi l itary ac t i on . He 
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stated that the United St at e s ,  even though it r e ali z ed the 
va lue of the cana l , wou ld not f ight for it in this  s i tuat i on 
and stated that any m i l i t ary ac t i on wou ld r e su lt in a tr e -
mend ou s shock to  the We st ' s  inf lu ence . He s t at ed that thi s  
wou ld re sult i n  a d ef in i t e  Soviet advancement . T o  E i sen-
hower , f or c e  was  n ot j u s t if ied ; i t  was  n ot in char act er with 
the United Nat ion s  Chart er and was not c ondu cive t o  promot ing 
h . f f 3 3  t e in luence o the We s t . 
E i s enhower wa s shocked t o  read from Eden that Na s ser ' s  
ac t i on wa s he ld in the same l ight a s  Hit ler ' s . The add it ional 
stat ement that Eden wou ld f ight becau se not t o  " wou ld be 
an ignoble end to our long h i s t ory i f  we accepted t o  p er i sh 
3 4  by d egr e e s . " E i s enhower recogn i zed that t o  u s e  f or c e  wou ld 
speed the end of Great Br itain ' s  power . He c o n s id ered N a s ser ' s 
act ion s a s  a " reckle s s  adv enture " but n ot at a l l  in the same 
light as Hit ler ' s  act i on s  up to 1 9 4 0 . He c lear ly saw the 
danger of creat ing a larg er image of Na s s er than real ly ex i s ted . 
He under st ood that f orce wou ld un ite the Arab s . I f  Br i tain u s ed 
force , Nas ser wou ld be p lac ed , by the We s t , into the p o s i t ion 
of lead er ship over the Arab s t at e s . The re sult of thi s wou ld 
dash a l l  hop e s  of the We st in pr event ing Soviet inf lu en ce in the 
ar e a .  E i senhower wa s shocked and maint ained the p o s i t i on that 
f orce was not the c orr ect p ath . The United Stat e s  wou ld not 
d . 3 5  con on e it s u se . 
SCUA wa s not what E d e n  and Mo llet wanted aft er Du l le s 
removed it s teeth . Eden , on the development of SCUA , s t arted 
act i on s  in the Un ited Nation s ,  France and Great Br it ain 
sent a me s s ag e  to  Emi l o  Nunez -P ortuand o , Pre s ident of the 
Un it ed N at io n s  S ecur ity C ounc i l , exp la ining the s ituat i on 
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as  they saw it . Thi s wa s d one t o  ca lm the Labor Party which 
demanded that the Un it ed N at ion s be u s e d  before any f or c e . 
Pre l iminary mov e s  then be gan in that d irect ion . 
Na s s er a l s o  announced that another c onference shou ld 
be c a l led t o  negot iate a sett lement wh ich wou ld inc lude 
su ch ar eas a s  the t o l l s , freedom of nav igati on , rev i s i on of 
the 1 8 8 8  treat y , and future cana l deve l opment . The pre s sure 
of the u s er n at ion s , the  Arab oil  c ountr ie s ,  p lu s  the  e c on omic 
san c t i on s  brought some ind icat i on of a c ompromi se  by N a s s er . 
The Br i t i s h  g overnment s tated that Nas s er ' s statement had no  
bas i s  f or futur e  neg ot iat ion . Since he had refu sed the f ive  
member c ommit t e e , wh o s e  prop o s a l s  wer e c on s idered a s  the 
basic po licy p o int s of the We s t ern nat ion s , no new ground s 
3 6  cou ld be deve loped . 
The Soviet Union qu ickly and loud ly re sponded . On 
Sept ember 1 5 , the Soviet g ov ernment at tacked SCUA as being a 
p lan of aggr e s s ion t oward s Egypt . I n  a long M o s c ow rad i o  
broad cast , a hint a t  nu clear u s ag e  wa s sugge sted with the 
c on t en t ion that any d i s turban ce of the p e ace  in the Midd le 
E a s t  wou ld be v iewed as a d ir e ct threat to the Soviet Union ' s 
nat i on a l  secur ity . The N a s ser -Suez c onf erence prop o s a l  wa s 
support ed , the United Nat i on s ' par t ic ipat ion cal led f or , and 
E i s e nhower was attacked f or n ot cr itic i z ing the host i le 
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m i l it ary mov e s  of h i s  We stern a l l ie s . Nas ser , on the same 
day , repl ied that if any S CUA ve s s e l  tried to push i t s  way 
through the canal , Egypt wou ld def end it s e l f . I t  wou ld be 
viewed as aggre s s ion and c ounter -mea sure s wou ld be initiat ed . 
Egypt wou ld unite with the Arab p e op le and show the ir c om-
3 7  bined strength t o  the We s t . 
The e ight een n at i on uni on of the London Conference 
rap id ly d e t er iorat ed . S CUA beg an t o  be wide ly and pub l i c ly 
cr itic i z ed , and a ca l l  f or United Nat ion s action emerged . 
More nat i on s start ed t o  c a l l  for the ac ceptance of N a s s er ' s 
prop osed c onference on t he canal . Ind ia took the lead and 
ins t igated t a lks in C airo . I nd ia a l s o  hoped t o  f ind f ert i le 
ground f or spec i f ic p o int s of negot iat i on . Move s were the n 
init iated to  generate  a j oint United Stat e s - I nd ia med iat i on 
between the We st and E gypt . E gypt , Iraq , and S audi  Arabia 
i s sued a j o int statement of Arab s o l id ar it y  on the cana l , the 
need  for Arab un ion again s t  ho st i l e  mov e s  of I srae l , and 
the need for a c onference t o  negot iate a s o lut ion on the 
can a l  d i sput e . The Soviet Union t hen j oined the bandwagon 
. f U . d N . 1 · 3 8  c a l l ing or a n 1t e  at1on s  s o  ut 1on . 
The Pre s id ent of the United Nations S e cur ity Coun c i l , 
Nun e z -Portuando of Cuba , and Secre tary G eneral Dag Hammer -
skj o ld from N orway , soon were inundat ed with letter s  from 
each s ide , From S eptember 1 2  t o  2 3 , Great Br ita in , E gypt , 
France , the Soviet Un ion , S yria , and Lebanon a l l  s ent note s 
c ondemn ing the other s i de , c a l l ing each other aggre s s or s , 
and warned that if n o  negot iat ion con t inued , for c e  may be 
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app l ied , F ina lly , on September 2 3 1 France and Great Britain 
asked that a U n it ed Natio n s  Se cur ity C oun c i l  be c a l led  t o  
conv ene on the act ion s begun by Eg ypt . E gypt replied 
in s imi lar fa shion p o inting t o  the increa sed tro op conc e n ­
trations in Cypru s b y  Great Br itain and Franc e . E gypt 
accu sed the two p ower s o f  United Nat ion s Chart er v io lat ion s 
ba sed on the military move s .  The counc i l  agreed to  hold a 
debate on the v ar ious  c la im s  wh ich s tart e d  on October s . 3 9  
The Un ited S t ate s ,  Great Br it ain , and Franc e , prior t o  
the Oct ober 5 d ebat e , worke d o n  secur ing a j o int p o l icy which 
wou ld contain a r e s o lut ion making int ernat ional contr o l  a 
ba s i s  f or any United Nat ion s s o lut ion . S o l idarity deve l op e d  
on ly betwe en France and Great Br i t a in . Du l le s ' c loudy 
ac tions in regard s t o  S CUA and h i s  ant i c o lonial stat ement s 
drew the two tog ether and away from secur ing a strong r e la ­
tion ship with the United S t ate s .  The prop o s e d  r e s o lut i on 
by France and Great Br itain d i d  not t ake a hard line p o s it i on . 
This  a llowed Du l l e s  to state that the Un ited Stat e s  supported 
the r e so lut ion . 4 0  
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Chapter F ive  
A F orced P e ace Re s t ored 
United Nat i on s  debat e s  took two f orms ; the f ir st be ing 
open and c lo sed Se curity Counc i l  de bate s and the se cond 
be ing private  di scu s s ion s betwe en French F ore ign Min i st er 
Chr i s t ian P in e au , Bri t i s h  F ore i gn Secretary Se lwyn Lloyd , 
Egypt ian F ore ign Min i st er F awz i , and United Nat ion s  Se cretary 
General Hammer skj o ld . Br it i sh and French pr op o s a l s  con-
si s t ed of f our p oint s wh ich were d ebat ed in  the S e curity 
Counc i l . The action wa s mod erat e and incorp orated a 
simi lar stand a s  that of an ear l ier ment ion ed r e s o lut ion 
by Ind ia . I t  ca l led  for an int ernat ional board to che ck on 
cana l op er at ion , d e c ide  on any charge of t o l l  v i o lation s , 
and rule on any pre j ud i c e s  re garding v e s s e ls u s ing the cana l . 
The board wou ld a l s o  ma intain fund s for improvement . Thi s  
re s o lut ion had an oDerat ion a l  c lau se ut i l i z ing the e ight e e n  
nat ion prop o sal . S in c e  E gypt wa s not a member of the 
Se cur it y  C ounc i l , it wa s al lowed to be repre sented . Thi s 
repr e s entation wa s without a vote on any r e s o lut ion be f ore 
the Counc i l .
1 
The debate cont ained many viewp oint s .  Shep i l ov , who re -
pre sented the Soviet Union , recommended that an enlarged con-
ference of  a l l  c ountr ie s  concerned be c a l led . In  add i t ion 
to thi s , a specific  board of the S ov i et Union , Egypt , 
France , Great Br itain , Ind ia , and the United Stat e s  be created 
to negot iate a sett lement f or the cana l . Al s o , he stated 
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that United Stat e s  o i l  int er e s t s  were behind a scheme to  
rep lac e French and Briti sh int ere st s in the area t o  contr o l  
o i l . H e  stated that the react ionary We s t  wa s trying t o  
2 dominat e Egyp t . 
D u l le s re sponded by re j ect ing Shep i lov ' s  stat ement s .  
He at tacked the S ov i e t  pro p o sa l , p o in t ing out that such a 
board wou ld be c l e arly d e ad locked due t o  the widely sepa-
rate viewpo int s .  D u l le s further stated that French and 
Br it i s h  r e s o lut io n s  wou ld rece ive Amer ican sup p ort . D u l le s 
wa s suc c e s s fu l  in  keep ing p o l it i c s out o f  the i s sue . Thi s  
wou ld then focu s attention on the s p e c i f i c  problems , lega l 
and operat ion a l , around the Sue z C ana l . 3 
The debate which s tart e d  on Oct ober 5 ended in an 
e le ven to z ero vote in  favor of  the rough draft of the 
re s o lut ion on Oct ober 1 3 . The Soviet Union , with Yug o s lavia ' s  
supp ort , vetoed the c lau se s of the re s o lut ion which were 
operat ion a l , thereby keep ing the re s o lution a paper document . 
Thi s wa s to  prevent the use  of the e ight e e n  nat ion prop o s a l  
from be ing imp lemented a s  t h e  operat ional c lau se  and a l s o  t o  
increase i t s  standing in  the eye s of  Arab nat i ona l i s t s . The 
Soviet Union , by showing support to  E gypt , obv i ou s ly furthered 
. . 4 it s own int ere s t s . 
T he United Nat i on s  S e cur ity C ounc i l  debate and sub s e quent 
vot e wa s on ly part of the activit i e s  in  the United Nat i on s . 
As wa s stated ear l ier , the s e c ond part wa s the c l o s e d  d i s -
cu s s io n s  between t he three p ower s with the Secre t ary Genera l . 
The se  informal c l o s e d  di s c u s s io n s  were far more s i gn i f icant 
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to  an und er standing of mot ive s behind the Fre nch and Bri t i s h  
move t o  u s e  the United Nat i on s . Pr ivat e d i s c u s s i ons cont inued 
to  make progre s s  up to the coun c i l vote . F awz i ,  Egypt ' s  r e -
pre sentat ive , c ame t o  the d i s cu s s i on s  with t he purp o s e  o f  
working out ground s for a n  acceptable s o lut ion . 5 
Egypt no  longer shouted ant i - imper i a l i s t  phra s e s  or 
ignored propo s a l s . F awzi  wa s a l l owed to  work f or a s o lution . 
This alt ered p o licy came about because of Arab pre s sur e s  
from o i l  producing stat e s  on Na s s er . They app l i ed thi s pre s sure 
due t o  the l o s s  o f  the r i ch o i l  roya l t ie s cau s e d  by  Nasser ' s 
nat ion a l i z at ion . Thi s wa s formidable pre s sure f or it meant 
a p o s s ib le break in  Arab s o l idar ity behind Nas ser ' s  actions  
which wou ld we aken h i s  contr o l . S e c ond ly ,  e conomic san c t i on s  
o f  the We st were depleting Egypt ' s  cap it a l  and credit which 
fore shad owed int ernal economic trouble . I f  thi s ec onomic 
s ituation con t i nue d , E gypt ians might lose  faith in  Nas ser 
and remove him from p ower . F awz i , therefore , wa s in  a p o s i ­
tion conduc ive t o  neg o t iat i on . 6 
The d i s cu s s ions made c on s iderab le headway . Maj or con tr i -
bu tor s were Ll oyd and F awz i . P ineau ma intained a p o sition of 
ind ifference t o  the d i s cu s s ions  be cau se of h i s  government ' s  
neg ot iat i on s with I srae l ,  By October 1 2 , the three repre s e nt a -
t i ve s , under Hammer skj o ld 1 s  wat chfu l eyes , agreed  o n  s ix p o int s . 
The s e  were rec ogn it ion o f  Egypt ian s ov ereignty , fre edom from 
politic s for the cana l , fre edom of  tran s it , j oint agreement of 
t o l l s  between u se r s  and Egypt , fund s for deve l opment , and d i s -
pute s  t o  b e  s o lved b y  arbitrat i on . Nutting p o inted out i n  h i s  
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book , N o  E nd of a Le s s on , th�t Lloyd per sona l ly cons idered that 
di scu s s io n s  had secured every d e s ired guarantee whi ch the Br i t i sh 
government sought from Egypt in regard s t o  the canal . 7 
The s e  s ix point s were pre sented before the S e curity 
C ounc i l  on Oct ober 1 3 . The Unit ed Nat ion s opened new d i s ­
cu s s io n s  on  the p o int s with a negat ive re sponse by Shepi lov 
who st i l l  s ought his s ix nation negotiation forum . The 
Sovie t  Union , after the e leven to  zero vote , vetoed the 
operat i ona l c lau s e s which were based on the earlier e ighte e n  
nation prop o s a l . The s i x  ba s i c  princ ip l e s  were supported 
by Egypt but not the ope rat ional c lause s .  Franc e and Great 
Br itain wanted them to be imp lemented through th e i nternational 
board . This  now became the crucial fact or . 8 
Egyp t  re sponded by prop o s ing three p o int s wh ich had to  be 
incorp orat e d . C ooperat ion betwe en E gypt ' s  company and the 
canal u se r s  in saf eguarding Egypt ian s ov ere ignty wa s one of the 
point s , a result  of I n d ia ' s  repre sent at ive  Menon who per suaded 
Na s s er t o  c on s ider a u s er s ' c lub instead of the SCUA typ e of 
u s er re pre sentation . The s econd point c a l led f or mutual ly fair 
to l l s  and charg e s . The third p o int ca l led  f or the allo cat ion 
from c anal profit s of  a reas onab le p ercentage for canal deve lop ­
ment . Thi s was in  direct op p o s it io n  t o  the S oviet act i o n s . I t  
marked the acc eptance of u s er part ic ipat ion and announced common 
9 ground s for a sett lement to be ba sed on . 
Private d i scu s s ion s were o nc e  again in it iat e d . P ineau 
had , on  Oct ober 1 2 , pub l i c l y  denounc ed the pr ivate d i s cu s s io n s  
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a s  a fai lure due t o  the lack of a ba s i s  f or negotiation ! 
Fawz i ignored th i s  at tempt t o  ha lt the d i scu s s ions  s in c e  he 
wa s now in a p o s it ion to s ign a b i nd ing document s e cur ing a 
sett lement of  the s i tuat i on on a l l  p o int s of c ontention . Thi s  
sett lement had t o  inc lude Egypt ' s  s overeignty and rec ogn it ion 
of it s operat i on of the cana l . A mee t ing was set  for October 
2 9  in Geneva . P i neau wa s somewhat r e l ieved after the S oviet 
vet o  and Egypt ian d i s approval of  the operat iona l factors , be ­
cau se  it  meant a p o s s ible deadl ock , thereby mak ing Mal let ' s  
p lans with I srae l v iab le . The Unit ed  Nat ions  S e cre tary Genera l , 
at D u l le s ' urgn ing , shifted from an obs erv er t o  a partic ipant . 
He in it iat ed communi cation betwe e n  him s e l f  and Fawz i . I n  thi s  
commun ication , Hammerskj o ld out l in e d  points  of  the negoti ations 
where a mutually acceptable agre eme nt cou ld be re ached . This 
1 0  exchang e o f  letter s started on Oct ober 2 4 .  
Nutting contend s ,  thr ough personal c onver sat ion s with 
Eden , that Br i t i s h  mot ive s  for inc lu d ing the e ight e e n  nat ion 
pr op o sa l in  the re s o lut ion on O c t ober 1 3 ,  came fr om d i strust 
for Dull e s , and that the s o lut ion wou ld recogn i z e  Egypt ' s  
sovere ignty regarding the canal . Dulle s had supp ort e d  the 
po s i t ion that a u s er s ' c lub be imp l ement ed instead of the 
e ight een nat i on prop o s a l  for the operat ion of the cana l . 
Eden d i stru sted  D u l l e s  and hat ed  Nas s er so much that he 
ordered Lloyd to inc lude the e ight een power po int in stead o f  
the users ' c lub . The e i ghteen p ower propo sa l ,  even though it 
re cogni zed  Egypt ian sovere ignt y , d id not p lace the canal i n  
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the hand s o f  an Egyp t ian company , As wa s men t ioned ear lier , 
the Unit ed  Stat e s  p o s i t i on appeared t o  be ambiguou s .  Du l l e s  
made statement s wh ich appear�d t o  infer that force wa s not out 
of the que s t ion . D u l le s a l so stated that f orce wou ld be the 
last re s ort . The Eden - -E i s enhower corre spondence downp layed 
any u s e  of force . Eden , ther efore , d i d  not tru st D u l le s ' change 
fr om the e ight e e n  nat ion propo sal , which was a moderat e ly hard 
stance , to a we ak s t ance of  the u s er s ' c lub . Eden then ordered 
Ll oyd to  reinsert the e ight e e n  nat i on prop o sal , for the opera-
t ional aspects of the canal ' s  s o lut ion , wh ich had been previou s l y  
1 1  stated a s  unacc eptable t o  Egypt . 
On the next day , October 1 4 , Eden wa s s e cre t ly br ie fed , 
along with Nut t ing , by the French Mini s ter of  Labor and Act ing 
Se cre tary , M .  Albert G a z ier , and French Deputy Chief of Staff 
f or the Air Force , G eneral Maurice  Challe . I n  thi s secret 
me et ing , the French per suaded Eden to  cal l off the Iraqi troop 
mov ement int o Jordan , t o  d i sre gard the Tr ipart ite  Pact , and 
to start p lans for a j o int I srae l i -French- Brit i sh inva s io n  of 
Egypt . Eden immed iat e ly recalled Ll oyd from New York , who wa s 
scheduled  to begin talks with Hammerskj o ld on s ecur ing a 
peacefu l  so lut ion . Eden , in halt in g  the Iraqi troop movement , 
failed to  enforce the Baghdad Pact . Jordan had called on 
Br it i sh a s s i s tance in re sponse to the ma j or repr i s al rai d s  com-
mitted by I srae l on  Jordan territory . I n  opting t o  go  with 
the French p lan , Eden sacrificed  the various Arab a l l i e s  o f  
Great Brit ain to  gain h i s  revenge o n  Nasser . Lloyd ' s  succe s s fu l  
1 2  talks wou l d , of  cour se , be another casua lty . 
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The French p lan c a l led f or an I srae l i  inv asion f ol l owed 
by a French - Brit i sh par atrooper and sea borne inva s i on . The 
I sr ae li s  wou ld br ing the f ighting c lo s e  enough to the c anal 
f or it to  be  threatened . Then , a j oint c ommunicat ion wou ld 
ca l l  f or the canal z one  to be evacuat ed with a sub sequ ent 
French and Br it i sh oc cupat i on to sav e  it fr om harm . They 
wou ld then occupy bo th key e ntranc e p ort s thu s return ing the 
ent ire cana l t o  t he ir d irect c ontr o l , end the I sr ae l i  b loc k-
1 3  ade , and cau s e  Na s ser ' s downf all . 
Eden had per suaded Lloyd t o  look at the Hamm er skj o ld 
d i s cu s s i on s  a s  a fai lure f or Br i t i sh and French int ere st s .  
Lloyd was s o  conv inced that he c on s idered F awz i ' s  negot iat ion s 
a s  a suc ce s s  f or Egypt over the West . E d en ' s ha lt ing of the 
Iraqi troop s cau sed rumor s to c ircu late pr ior to the Oct ober 
2 3  Jordan e lect ion s . The re sult wa s t he v irtua l  remov al of 
the pr o-We s t ern g overnment and it s rep lacement by a pro-Na s ser -
ite g overnment . On Oct ober 2 5 ,  J ord an entered int o a j oint 
Jordan - Syr ian-Egypt ian mi litary c ommand with over a l l  contro l  
i n  the hand s o f  an Egypt ian Command er i n  Chie f . On that 
same d ay , Eden ' s cabinet g ave f in a l  approva l t o  the j oint 
p lan , and I srae l ' s lead er , Dav id Ben-Gur i on agreed comp le t e ly 
t o  the French p lan . The day of the I sr ae l i inva s ion wa s s et 
f or Oct ober 2 9 . On that day of agreement , Nutt ing re s ig ned 
his po s i t i on from Eden ' s  government and left i n  s i lent pro -
1 4  te st . 
The advance made  i n  the pr ivat e Hammer skj o ld d i scu s s i on s  
wer e bl ocked on October 1 7  by a j o int Ang lo-French c ommunicat ion . 
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It  s t ated that the s ix p o int s were acceptab le , but they mu st 
a l s o  have an ac ceptance  of the e ighteen nat i on pr op o s a l  f or 
int ernat iona l c ontr ol of t he c anal ' s  oper at i on .  N a s s er , of 
c our s e , denied that any s o lution wou ld incorporat e an E gyp t ian 
lo s s  of c ontr o l . C onsu lt at ion s or j oint operat i on s  were a c -
ceptable . Menon u s ed his inf luenc e on Nas ser t o  have  him re -
state that c o -contro l  of the canal in i t s  oper at i on wa s ac -
ceptable . Britain and France re j e cted this on October 2 3  
after having a l s o  rej ected Hammerskj o ld ' s  attempt t o  start 
the negotiat i on d i s cu s s ion s ear l ier on Oct ober 1 9 .  A b lackout 
started on inf ormat ion to be g iven t o  the United S tate s .  
E i senhower no longer rece ived any inf ormat i on on the spec i f ic 
p lan s of his We s t ern a l l ie s due t o  his  strong s t ance ag ains t 
the ir plans  of  u s ing f orce . In a t e le v i s e d  pre s s  c onference 
on Oct ober 2 4 ,  E is e nhower s aid that Egypt wa s in it s legal 
. h . 1 °  h 1 1 5  rig t s  to  nationa i z e  t e c ana . 
When war broke out , E is enhower pre s s ed f or a United Na-
tions  sett lement . The  United  S t at e s  pub l i c ly s t ated that it s 
p o s it ion wou ld be to  uphold the Tripartite P act and a s s i s t  
the v ictim , wh ich was Egypt . The Amer ican r e s o lution , which 
was intr oduc ed into an emergency s e s s i on of  the Unit ed Nat ions 
Secur ity C ounc i l  on Oct ober 3 0 , was vetoed by the French and 
Br it ish . Great Br itain had stained her unb lemi shed re cord of 
not u s ing her v e t o  privi leg e s . The veto was con s idered ne c e s -
sary i n  order t o  d efend Br itain ' s  breach o f  the United Nat ion s 
Chart er and t o  strengthen it s cour se  of f orce fu l  act ion in s tead 
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of  peacefu l n egot iat ion . The Soviet  de legat e immediate ly 
introduced a s imi lar r e s o lut ion which met the same fate as 
the United Stat e s ' . 1 6  
The United State s '  r e s o lution c a l led  f or an immediat e  
cease f ire , withdrawa l t o  arm i s t i c e  line s ,  that a l l  member s  
r e frain from u s ing force , and tha t  n o  military a i d  b e  g iven 
t o  e ither s ide . E i s e nhower , in a pre s s  c on ference on Octo-
ber 3 1 , blasted the I srae l i  invas i on , the Br i t i sh-Fre nch 
ult imatum of October 3 0 ,  and the Brit i s h  and Fre nch veto of 
the United Stat e s '  prop o s a l  in t he United Nat i on s . 1 7  
The ult imatum t o  Egypt wa s shown t o  b e  a sham due t o  i t s  
c lau se that both c ombat ant s remove them s e lv e s  from t e n  m i le s 
on either s ide  of the cana l . By Oct ober 3 0 ,  I sraeli forc e s  
were s l ight ly le s s  than one hundred m i l e s  from the cana l . 
Thi s  meant that the c anal was n o t  at a l l  endangered . It wou ld 
have g iven I srae l the who le S inai are a  and wou ld have near ly 
d iv ided Egypt in ha lf . The u s e  of  French f l own French p lane s 
t o  help protect the I srae l i  inva s ion wa s proof of c o l lu s ion , 
for it wa s bef ore any u lt imatum wa s made . E i s enhower real i zed 
the terr ib le wrong that wa s committed by his a l l i e s  and br ought 
the p ower of Amer ican economic and p o l i t ical might to bear 
. h 1 8  against t em . 
E i senhower r e fu s ed t o  l oan Great Britain any emergency 
fund s to bai l  it out becau se of  a run on the p ound . Rap i d  d e -
p le t i on of Br ita in ' s  sterl ing re serv e s  shocked E d e n  out of hi s 
re ckle s s  and dangerou s p lan s . E i senhower brought to  bear the 
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strength of Amer ican p o l it ical might and ut i l i z e d  the United 
Nati ons G enera l As sembly . An American prop o s ed c e a se f ire 
was d e l ivered to the French and Br i t i sh g overnment s . 1 9  
Eden realized  that he c ou ld not ma inta in h i s  actions  
without Amer ican supp ort and with Amer ican opp o s it ion . He  
informed the  French that Great Bri tain wou ld acc ept the  cease  
f ire terms and  a l l ow the  special ly created United  Nations 
Emergency Force ( U . N . E . F . ) of  three sma l l p ower nat ions  to  
take over oc cupat ion . The French cou ld not g o  i t  a l one be ­
cause  the Brit i sh c ontr ibut ion wa s t o o  great t o  be without , 
and the chain of c ommand over the j oint f or c e  wa s a Br i t i s h  
structure . The French were  su l len ly forced t o  accept Amer ica ' s  
Unit ed  Nation s ' t erms . 2 0  
Na s ser ' s E gypt maintained it s ownership of the cana l . 
Nas ser remained in power . Eden ' s government wa s virtua l ly 
crippled . The French emp ire started t o  rap i d ly decay . More ­
over the Uni t e d  S t at e s  had taken a surpr i s ing p o s it ion again s t  
it s t wo ma j or a l l ie s , whi le t he Soviet U n i on had now bre ached 
the c onta inment p o l icy in the Middle E a s t . 
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Chapter S ix 
C onclu s ion 
Whe n the  cana l was  re stored to  working ord er , a drast i c ­
a l ly d if ferent turn o f  event s awaited  both t h e  E ast and the 
We st in  the Midd le E a s t . The bipo lar wor ld balance was again 
changed . Previou s ly domin ant p owers wer e in  rap id d e c l ine , 
and the Middle E a st was underg o ing a r ap id trans it ion . 
The overa l l  out c ome f or I srae l wa s extreme ly grat ifying . 
The Egyp t i an - C z e cho s l ovakian weapon s and p lane s  were de stroyed . 
F edayeen bas e s  in the Sinai were d e stroyed . I sr ae l  acqu ired 
a l l  the  new weapons it  needed . I sr ae l  opened the Gu l f  of 
Aqaba by u s i ng a United Nat i on s  r e s o lut ion and the Unit ed  
Nat ion s Emergence F orce . The  re s o lut i on made the  gulf  op en 
t o  I srae l i  v e s s e l s  and the U . N . E . F .  p laced troop s in the area 
of Aqaba t o  enforce the r e s o lut i on . I n  add i t ion t o  thi s , 
I srae l had i t s  Sinai  and G a za border prob lems c ared f or by the 
U . N . E . F .  troop s unt i l  1 9 6 7 . I sr ae l  cou ld re lax and cont inu e  
t o  bui l d  it s strength in the are a . 
Nas ser and Egypt acquired a uni que succe s s . Even though 
it s armed f orce s were devastated ,  and it s terr i t ory invaded 
in  the " batt le " , Egypt won the " war" . The canal became 
s o l e ly contr o l led  by an Egyp t ian c ompany . All  revenu e s  wou ld 
be g iven to Egypt . I nt ernat ional part ic ipat ion wa s l imited 
to  a c ooperat ive board . Great Britain , I srae l ,  and France 
were brand ed as aggre s s or s , providing Egypt wor ld j us t if ica­
tion of it s peacefu l intent ion s . Egypt gained the suppo s e d ly 
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un l imited a s s i stance of  the Soviet Union in  economic aid , 
in United Nat ion s act ion s ,  and in mi l it ary aid . Na s s er emerged 
an Arab hero , further hurt ing the pro -We stern Middle East 
government s .  Nas ser ' s  Aswan Darn was no  longer an airy pro ­
paganda p loy but a concre te  proj ect for the near future . 
France was left in  a much wor se  p o s i t ion . Bitter at 
hav ing v ictory for i t s  Algerian , Nas ser , and Midd l e  Eastern 
prob lems snatched fr om it s gra sp by the American cease  f ire  
order , her emp ire wou ld rap idly be broken apart . Her traiter­
ou s d e a l ing s in arre s ting the Algerian F . L . N .  repre sentat ives  
under a French truce backfired . Franc e had hoped that once 
Nas s er wa s de stroyed , the Alger ian rebe l s , e i ther under the 
aforement ioned arre st or tho s e  s t i l l  fight ing , wou ld lose  
heart and accept French d ictated term s . Inst ead , Algeri a ' s  
revo lt gained fue l and would eventua l ly re sult in France ' s  
departure from Algeria . France ' s  ho ld on Tuni s ia and Morocco 
would a l s o , as  a re sult , be l os t . France wa s branded a s  an 
aggr e s sor in the United Nat i on s ,  further damaging i t s  wor ld 
" pr e st ige " .  G uy Mal let ' s  government wou ld , a s  a re sult , l o s e  
it s popu lar support , and France wou ld again return t o  p o l it i ­
cal turmo i l  at home . 
Great Br itain ' s  s ituat ion in the advent of ho s t i l i t i e s  
wa s the wor s t  o f  a l l . N o t  o n l y  had Br itain ' s  i n f luence been 
devastated in E gypt , it also lost it s mil itary , ec onomic , and 
p o l it ical i n f luence in  Jordan . J ordan ' s  pro-Br i t i s h  govern­
ment wa s reduced to a minority as a re s u lt of Britain ' s  
act ion s in Egyp t . Na s ser ' s J ordan f o l l ower s gained the 
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maj or ity p o s it ion in it s government , pushing K ing Hus s e in 
away from the We st . The Baghdad Pact  became v i ewed by it s 
Midd le E a s t ern memeber s with suspic i on . Br itish  o i l  supp lie s ,  
which Eden was so  grav e ly c onc erned about , were t emporar i ly 
s t opped . Nas s er kept the c anal b locked wh i le the Syr ian s 
s l owed the p ip e l ine  repair s ,  creat ing the maj or o i l  shor tage 
f eared by Eden . Thi s showed the Arab s what c ou ld be accomp li shed 
by u s ing o i l  as a d ip lomat i c  lever . Thi s further j u s t if ied 
Na ss er ' s  thr e e  part Arab p lan . Great Br itain ' s  economy almo s t  
c o l lap sed d u e  to  the run on i t s  ster l ing r e serve s ,  u s ing up 
we l l  over a b i l l i on in g overnment ho ld ing s .  D i s as ter was 
narr owly avert ed in both c a s e s  by Amer ican o i l  and emergency 
loans . Gre at Br itain l o s t  her unb lemi shed United Nat i on s  
rec ord of n ot u s ing it s veto p ower by twice abu s ing i t  f or 
s e lf i s h  mot iv e s . Thi s proved t o  be a r e su lt of trying to  
further it s aggre s s ive  act i on s  in v i o lat ion of  the  Un ited 
Nat io n s  Charter . I n  add it i on to  t h i s , E d en ' s  g overnment l o s t  
it s stand ing i n  P ar l i amen t , re sult ing in a c omp lete r e s truc ­
tur ing of the C on servat ive Party and Eden ' s re s ignat ion and 
sub s e quent nervou s bre akd own . 
The S ov iet  Union mad e tr emend ou s g ain s far above and 
beyond N a s s er ' s .  The achievement of a two -century-old 
prev iou s ly denied obj ect iv e  was ac c omp l i shed . The Soviet 
Union rap i d ly increa sed it s inf luence in the Midd le E a s t . 
It  gained a succ e s sfu l br eac h  of We stern containment policy 
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by a nonaggr e s s ive accepted method . The Soviet Union gained 
po lit i ca l  stand i ng in Egypt , Syri a , and Jordan . Commun i st 
China achieved recognit i on . Soviet a i d  wa s c on s idered more 
acceptable than We s t  European aid . The eventual accl aim f or 
the A s wan High Dam increased  Soviet pre s t ige  i n  Arab eye s . 
Mo st important ly of a l l , the Sue z  i nva s ion by France and Great 
Br itain al lowed the Sov iet Union t o  d irect wor ld op inion away 
from i t s  v i o lent subj ugati on of Hungary . The We s t  wa s divided , 
i t s  NATO forces  drai ne d , and i t s  act ive r e s pon s e  t o  the Hungar ian 
situat ion impo s s ible , thu s  s e cur ing for the Soviet s fre edom 
of  ac t ion in Hungary . 
The turmoi l over S u e z  deeply affected the United S tate s .  
Amer ica ' s  c ontainment of communi sm i n  the Middle E a st was 
c ircumvent e d . I t s  i ntere st s ,  pri vate and publ i c , were j e opard­
i zed by  it s a l li e s ' ac t i on s . The United State s wa s not con­
sulted at all  by its  two maj or allie s wh ile  they were p lanning 
a ma j or mil itary operat ion . Thi s re sulted i n  a ser i ou s  d iv i ­
s i on between France and the United State s with o n ly a t emporary 
chi l l  between Great Britain and the United State s . E i s enhower ' s  
pr i zed United Nat ion s  wa s a lmo s t  de stroye d , o n ly to  be barely 
saved by his  and Hammerskj o ld ' s sta lwart action s . The United 
Nat i on s proved a lmo s t  bankrupt due to i t s  inabi lity t o  r e s pond 
in Hungary . French and Br i t i sh action s , i f  allowed t o  go  un­
checked through a United Nat i on s  re s olut ion , would  have  r e ­
su lted i n  i t s  ( the Unit ed Nat io n s ) be i ng d i scredited in the 
eyes of  the th ird wor ld and the wor ld i n  ge nera l . E i s enhower , 
at the near exp ense  of  the United State s ' ma j or a l l ie s , s av e d  
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the United Nat ion s fr om de struct ion . D u l le s ' State Department 
met with har sh Congre s s io n a l  and pub lic  cr it i c i sms f or n ot 
avert ing the inv a s i on . The tre acherou s  actions  of our E ur o -
pean a l l ie s and the sub sequent c onta inmen t breach added t o  D u l le s ' 
he a lth prob lems ; he had begun t o  show cr itical  cancer inf ect i on . 
E i senhower , on July S ,  1 9 5 7 , p ledged America t o  defend and sup ­
p or t  the Midd le E a s t  by i t s e lf thr ough the creat i on of the 
E i s enhower D octr ine . The United S t at e s  had t o  reev aluate it s 
p o s i t i on in the Midd le E a s t , attempt t o  rep air the damag e s  
committed by it s a l l ie s , and repair the ir e c on omie s .  Amer ica ' s  
p o s it i on wa s threat e ne d , and it s Eurou e an a l lie s were c le ar ly on 
the dec line . The We st wa s d i s j ointed and the United Nat ions  
weakened . The We st failed to  act in c oncert in  the Middle E a st . 
The princ i p le s  of We s tern democracy and fre e d om were s evere ly 
tainted in the eye s of the Arab wor ld whi le the Soviet image 
rap i d ly impr ov ed . Arab nationalism and fading co lonial pr e s t ige  
had ign ited a p owd er keg  in the Midd le E as t . 
The S ov ie t  v ictory , after hav ing been achieved , s l owly began 
to  d e c l ine . At the May 1 9 6 4  op ening c eremony of the Aswan Dam ' s 
first stage , Khruschev sh owed his  growing d i sp le asure with the 
policie s of N a s s er ' s  g overnment . The re lease of E gypt ian C om­
mun i s t  pr i s on er s  by Na s s er ca lmed the situat i on . I n  Oct ober of 
1 9 6 4  Khru schev was removed from p ower and Nas ser d i s trusted h i s  
rep lac ement . Nas ser s lowly began t o  rea l i z e  that Soviet aid was 
structured to make Egypt depe ndent upon the S ov ie t b loc for 
fini shed good s . The S ov i e t  U n i on halted the indu str ia l deve lop ­
me nt o f  Egyp t  and by 1 9 6 7  the Egyp t i an m i li tary struc ture was 
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dominated by Soviet adv i s or s  provided by S oviet Pre s id e nt 
Podgorny . As a r e su lt Na s ser reopened d ip lomat ic re lat i on s  with 
the We st , i . e . , Great Br itain on November 1 9 , 1 9 6 7  and by accept ­
ing the Amer ican p lan f or a cease  f ire  in 1 9 6 9 . 
After Na s s er ' s death in S e ptember of 1 9 7 0 ,  Anwar Sadat 
bec ame Egypt ' s  new leader . In  a speech g iven on Ju ly 2 3 , 1 9 7 2 
Sadat announ ced the repatr iati on of a l l  S oviet per sonne l ( s ix 
thou sand ) and all Sov ie t ba se s wou ld revert to Egypt ian con­
tr o l .  Sadat had retr ieved Egypt ' s  independence and reopened 
Egyp t ' s  re lati on s with the We st after s ixteen year s of  S ov i e t  
inf luence . 
( 1 0 0 ) 
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